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REGULATED MOTOR CARRIERS AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
Leslie W. Jacobsj
Regulatory activities in recent years have repeatedly involved
conflicts, or at least confrontations, with antitrust policies. Although
most regulated industries must face these issues in the context of their
respective governing statutes and agencies, concentration on develop-
ments with respect to motor carrier regulation has been notable.'
This industry is currently the favorite nominee for an experiment in
deregulation 2 largely due to its low entry requirements and the sub-
stantial number of firms which, if no longer regulated, would "probably
come as close to the model of pure competition as is possible in the
real world."3 This article will explore the background of motor carrier
regulation, its relationship to antitrust policies and enforcement, and
proposals for change.
I
LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY
Commercial trucking was almost unknown in 1920 and was ignored
in the Transportation Act of 1920,4 which adjusted existing railroad
t Member of the Ohio Bar; member of the Transportation Subcommittee of the
Committee on Industry Regulation of the American Bar Association Antitrust Section.
B.S.B.A. 1965, Northwestern University; J.D. 1968, Harvard University.
I Assistant Attorney General Richard W. Mctaren, speaking before the Antitrust
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, suggested "that regulatory statutes for
surface transportation be given a careful, public re-evaluation." McLaren, Antitrust
and Competition-Review of the Past Year and Suggestions for the Future, in NEvw YoRKc
STATE BAR Ass'N, 1971 ANTIrRUST LAw SYmposium 13 (1971). Walker B. Comegys, Mc-
Laren's successor as acting head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, has
reiterated the Division's concern with motor carrier transportation. Address by Walker
B. Comegys, Briefing Conference on Antitrust Settlement Process of the Federal Bar
Association, June 13, 1972.
2 The President's Council of Economic Advisers recently specified consideration of
deregulation as "a matter of urgent national priority." PRESmENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADvisERs, ANNUAL REPORT 127-28 (1971). The 1970 Report of the same group stated that
"regulation should be narrowed or halted when it has outlived its original purpose"
(PRESDENT's COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvIsERs, ANNUAL REPORT 108 (1970)), and Mr.
McLaren has expressed the Antitrust Division's opinion that "regulation of surface trans-
portation has done just that." McLaren, supra note 1, at 9.
3 Nelson & Greiner, The Relevance of the Common Carrier Under Modern Eco-
nomic Conditions, in TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 352, 364 (National Bureau Comm. for
Econ. Research ed. 1965).
4 Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); see J. FILGAs,
YELLOW IN MOTION 1-10 (2d ed. 1972), offering a case in point.
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regulation to the financial consequences of government operation
during the war years and a post-war Depression. This legislation first
introduced the concept of transportation consolidation and exemption
from the antitrust laws.5 Only rail carriers were affected, and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission was directed to develop a national plan
to encourage structural simplification.
Continued economic difficulties in farm areas in the 1920's led to
passage of the Hoch-Smith Resolution in 1925, which directed the ICC
to improve free movement of agricultural products "at the lowest
possible lawful rates compatible with the maintenance of adequate
transportation service . . . ."7 This legislative mandate resulted in
limitations on rate increases.8 Further pressures from shippers during
the initial years of the Depression led Congress to enact the Trans-
portation Act of 1933, 9 again directing the Commission to ensure the
"lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of... service." 10 However,
that directive "proved inadequate to ensure sufficient rail revenues"
from movement of the bulk commodities peculiarly suited to rail trans-
portation."
The solution to the railroad predicament in the 1930's appeared
to be an improved rate structure for high value, short-haul goods.
However, the ICC faced the phenomenon of a new, fast, flexible alterna-
tive for the movement of these products by truck. It was clearly in the
interest of the Commission and its rail protectorate to secure the
regulation of motor carriers as long as railroads had to operate with
politically dictated rates that did not reflect cost-of-service pricing.
It should not be assumed that trucking interests were wed to the
ICC at the point of a shotgun;' 2 quite the contrary was true for
5 Prior to the enactment of what is now § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 5 (1970), the antitrust laws applied in full force to railroads. Some of the strong-
est and earliest Sherman Act opinions struck down railroad combinations. E.g., United
States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226
US. 61 (1912); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); see Lindahl, The Antitrust Laws and
Transportation, 11 ANrTRusr BuLL. 37, 38-46 (1966). The legislative history of § 5
concerning carrier consolidations is outlined in detail in the appendix to the opinion
of the Supreme Court in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 315-21
(1954).
6 49 U.S.C. § 55 (1970).
7 Id.
8 A. F,..DLAENDER, THE Di.EmmiA or FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION 19 (2d ed. 1970).
9 Ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 5, 5a, 15a, 15b, 19a (1970)).
10 49 U.S.C. § 15a(2) (1970).
11 A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 8, at 21.
12 The following analysis of the events leading to the enactment of the Motor Carrier
Act, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970)), is drawn from
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the larger firms. The 1920's had witnessed a classic case of complete
competition. There was only minimal state regulation,13 and un-
hindered entry into the market encouraged so-called wildcat operators.' 4
By 1931 many of the more influential operators had organized the
American Trucking Associations as a national counterpart of the
existing bus industry groups,' 5 intending to join those groups in seek-
ing to promote uniform regulation to eliminate the ruinous competitive
practices which prevailed. Although existing state associations formed
the nucleus of the ATA, it had become clear that state by state varia-
tions were impractical to achieve the desired goals.,'
The private promotion of the desire for federal regulation paral-
leled three other developments: (1) a succession of post-1926 bills and
hearings, 17 (2) the increased concern of the ICC, and (3) the personal
pressure applied by Joseph B. Eastman, then Chairman of the ICC and
later Federal Coordinator of Transportation. The Commission pre-
sented its study of motor transportation to Congress in 1931 in support
of its argument for expanded jurisdiction.'8 The argumentative section
of the report, "Regulation or Unrestricted Competition?,"' 9 emphasized
the unfairness to regulated commerce, particularly the railroads, which
stemmed from continued nonregulation of motor carriers. This attitude
was probably characteristic of biases present in the Commission at that
a previous article. Jacobs, Second Thoughts: Regulation of Securities of Inter-City Motor
Common Carriers of Property, 80 OIo ST. I.J. 84, 86-88 (1969).
13 Even such state regulation was narrowly circumscribed with respect to interstate
commerce by the Supreme Court's decision in Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1925) (states may not regulate interstate commerce with the object of restricting com-
petition).
14 See STrF OF SENAr Comm. ON CoiRracE, 907Hr CONG., Isr SEss., EvALUAnON Or
THE MOTOR CARRIER AcT OF 1935, at 39 (Comm. Print 1965).
15 The American Transit Association and the National Association of Motor Bus
Operators.
16 Generally, the disagreement within the ATA focused on whether to seek a new
motor carrier agency or to encourage expansion of the ICC. See STAF OF SENATE Com-ma.
ON CoMMER cE, supra note 14, at 40-41.
17 H.R. 12380 (70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1928)) and H.R. 7954 (71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929))
set up a commission to fix rates and safety regulations for common carriers operating in
interstate commerce. Neither bill got out of committee. Later bills, such as H.R. 10288,
71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), contained stricter safety, financial responsibility, and rate
standards for the proposed regulatory commission to follow. H.R. 10288 passed the House
but was defeated in the Senate. See Magnuson, The Motor Carrier Act of 1935: A Legislator
Looks at the Law, 31 Gao. WASH. L. Rv. 37,42-43 (1962).
18 L. ]FLYNN, COORDINATION OF MOTOR TRANSPORTATION, S. Doc. No. 43, 72d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1931).
19 Id. at 93-95. The theme of unfairness to the regulated portions of an industry
developed here was further noted in the Attorney General's Report on the Antitrust Laws
as a common cause for broader regulation. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL Coxr-
mraa To SrTuy Tm Asesmiusr LAws, REPORT 269 (1955).
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time.20 The railroads were being hurt by the low marginal profit rates
that truck and bus lines were then forced to maintain in order to sur-
vive. The shippers themselves-presumably an important segment of
the "general public" to be benefited-voiced opposition to the proposed
regulation.21
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 2 offered the pro-
spect of a genuine bonanza in the form of limitations on competition
without the "public benefit" restrictions of most statutory regulation.
Reversing its pro-ICC stance,23 the ATA spearheaded the formation of
a trucking code; it "was an opportunity to get regulation self-imposed
and Government enforced." 24 Although the code was adopted by the
ATA board of directors, the operation of the scheme had barely
evolved when the NIRA was declared unconstitutional.25
This brief experience reduced intra-industry opposition to regula-
tion (at least among those of influence), allowing the choice between
the ICC and a new agency to be faced squarely. The decision was made
to seek amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act. The ATA thereby
made its third shift in function during its short life: from trade orga-
nization to code administrator to lobbyist.20
The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 193327 provided
for a Federal Coordinator of Transportation, whose responsibilities
included studying "means... of improving transportation conditions
throughout the country."28 From the time of Chairman Eastman's
20 When he was talking with ATA members, ICC Chairman Eastman candidly
admitted this bias as a natural result of a 45-year relationship with the railroads: "You may
think that the ICC is old, hidebound, and railroad oriented. Maybe it is, but not to the
extent that it cannot undertake a new job." Sr OF SENATE COmm. ON COMMER E, supra
note 14, at 43.
21 The shippers met with the response that "[p]ublic demand should not be confused
with public need or what is in the public interest." L. FLYNN, supra note 18, at 97.
22 Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195. The Act provided for the formation of the National Recovery
Administration to superintend the adoption and enforcement of industry codes which
were designed to coordinate competition. The purpose of the statute was to spur industrial
and commercial recovery from the Depression through joint planning.
23 The Association actually opposed the original Rayburn bill (H.R. 6836, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933)), an immediate predecessor of the Eastman motor carrier bill (S. 1629, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)). See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REGULATION OF
TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
24 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMER CE, supra note 14, at 41.
25 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Furthermore,
since most small operators did not belong to the ATA, the code's provisions were open to
charges of discrimination.
26 One of its founders prefers the phrase "legislative committee actively seeking
regulation." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERcE, supra note 14, at 42.
27 Ch. 91,48 Stat. 211 (expired 1936).
28 Id. at 216.
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appointment it became inevitable that motor carrier regulation would
be recommended and that it would follow the ICC's familiar railroad
format. The ICC's Section of Research, which was established to
develop the means of improvement, was intermodal in approach. In
March 1934, its report 2 and recommended legislation, known as the
Eastman bill, were transmitted to the Senate, where they formed the
basis of the Motor Carrier Act. 0
Within fifteen years of the birth of the motor carrier industry, ICC
regulation of interstate trucking was a reality. But it was regulation
with a unique New Deal rationale. The original Interstate Commerce
Act31 was designed, among other things, to control the excesses of
natural monopoly-in effect to fill a void where competitive principles
did not apply to restrict prices and to increase supply because of the
nature of the business. Conversely, the Motor Carrier Act represented
a conscious decision to eliminate open and natural competition. The
Federal Coordinator of Transportation's reports32 outline the three
principal bases for this approach: protection of the railroads, stabiliza-
tion and consolidation of the trucking industry, and support of organ-
ized labor through the elimination of owner-operators.
It was obvious that the Motor Carrier Act and its proponents were
directly contradicting the antitrust principles previously adopted as
national policy.83 Commissioner Eastman's concern with the "coordina-
tion" of railroad and motor carrier transportation was formally in-
corporated into the Transportation Act of 1940,34 in which, subsequent
to the extension of regulation to motor carriers, Congress reaffirmed the
goal of voluntary consolidations of carriers within modes and the
separation of transportation policies from antitrust policies. The 1940
29 FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 23.
30 Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970)).
31 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter referred to as "the Act"].
32 FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 23; FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF
TRANSPORTATION, 1934 REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reviewed
and summarized in Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation, 19 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRusr SECTION 261, 283-97 (1961).
38 There are some who think that the thing to do is to let down the bars and
allow the competitors to fight it out to the finish. This would, of course, require
practical abandonment of railroad regulation, leaving redress of grievances to
the courts. The eventual result might be a kind of coordinated system of trans-
portation, achieved through survival of the fittest, but the greater competitive
strength of the railroads would be likely to distort the results. The fact is that
this plan of free-for-all competition has never worked successfully, either here or
elsewhere. It has been tried and found wanting.
FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 23, at 23.
34 Ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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Act added the National Transportation Policy as a preamble to each
Part of the Interstate Commerce Act:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the
Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes
of transportation subject to the provisions of this act ... so admin-
istered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each;
to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and
foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the
several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance
of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or de-
structive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States
and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair
wages and equitable working conditions-all to the end of develop-
ing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system
35
With the adoption of these guidelines, Congress created a centrally
planned transportation sector at the heart of an intentionally un-
planned economy. The result was to be an artificial allocation of
transportation resources and a rate structure reflecting traditional
commodity-mode categories rather than the most efficient movement
of goods.
II
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Motor Carrier Act 6 added Part I137 to the Interstate Com-
merce Act to subject motor carriers to regulation similar to that applied
to railroads. The Transportation Act of 194088 amended sections of
Part 139 to consolidate a number of provisions for motor carriers and
other modes. Through these amendments, the Commission was given
authority to regulate fully all common and contract motor carriers
moving in interstate or foreign commerce,40 subject to exceptions for
certain regulations as to specified transportation uses, 41 and to estab-
lish safety requirements for private carriers.42
85 49 U.S.C. preceding §§ 1, 301, 901, 1001 (1970).
86 Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
37 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970).
38 Ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898.
89 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1970).
40 Id. §§ 302, 304.
41 For example, school buses, taxicabs, and farm vehicles. Id. § 303(b).
42 Id. § 304(a)(3).
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Section 5(1) of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits any
contracts, agreements, or combinations between regulated common car-
riers for the pooling or division of traffic, service, or earnings, unless
the Commission finds after a hearing that such pooling or division "will
be in the interest of better service to the public or of economy in
operation, and will not unduly restrain competition." 4
Commission approval is required pursuant to section 5(2) for any
two or more regulated carriers to consolidate or to merge; jointly to
purchase, lease, or operate another carrier; or jointly to acquire control
of another carrier.44 An exception is made in the case of such transac-
tions by motor carriers whose combined gross operating revenues do
not exceed $300,000 annually.4 5 Commission approval is also required
before a single regulated carrier may acquire control of another carrier,
before a person not a carrier may acquire control of two or more car-
riers, or before a person not a carrier but controlling any carrier may
acquire control of any additional carrier.48
Control may be acquired through ownership of stock "or other-
wise," 47 as construed in general by section l(3)(b) of the Act
to include actual as well as legal control, whether maintained
or exercised through or by reason of the method or circumstances
surrounding organization or operation, through or by common
directors, officers, or stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a
holding or investment company or companies, or through or by
any other direct or indirect means; and to include the power to
exercise control.48
43 Id. § 5(1).
44 Id. § 5(2)(a)(i).
45 Id. § 5(10).
46 Id. § 5(2)(a)(i). Several subsidiary carriers may in effect be acquired, however,
without § 5(2) authorization if they are acquired as an integrated "system." See Woods
Industries, Inc.-Control-United Transports, Inc., 85 M.C.C. 672 (1960). But see General
Movers Corp.-Control-Martin Van Lines, Inc., 101 M.C.C. 748 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smyth v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 387 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (non-carrier may not purchase
two separate carriers in single transaction without prior authorization, even when those
carriers form integrated transpotation system).
47 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(a)(i) (1970). The "otherwise" language has been utilized to find
indirect acquisition of control by a holding company when a controlled subordinate com-
pany acquires a control interest in a carrier. See Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353
U.S. 151 (1957); Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge & R.R. Merger, 295 I.C.C. 11 (1955);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Purchase, 261 I.C.C. 239 (1945). See also United States v. Marshall
Transp. Co., 322 U.S. 31, 36-40 (1944).
48 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(b) (1970). Legislation recently proposed by the Commission would
establish presumptive control on the basis of ownership of 5% or more of the voting
securities. H.R. 19720, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1970, at 67, col. 8.
Control is also equated by the Act with "management in a common interest of any
two or more carriers" (49 U.S.C. § 5(4) (1970)), and it is deemed by the statute to be
accomplished in a transaction:
(a) if such transaction is by a carrier, and if the effect of such transaction
[Vol. 58:90
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Commission approval of consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions
follows an application and notification to the parties, to the governor of
each affected state, and to the joint board for the affected states,49
with opportunity provided for each to be heard.50 Although the statute
clearly contemplates regular approvals whenever the proposed trans-
actions "will be consistent with the public interest," the Commission
may modify an application and may condition its approval.5 '
Section 5(4) declares illegal any unapproved direct or indirect con-
trol transaction, 52 and the Commission is granted investigatory author-
ity to discover violations.5 3 Commission orders, which may be sup-
plemented as necessary,54 are enforceable by the Commission in United
States district courts.55 Section 8 provides for damages and attorney's
fees to any person injured by a violation of section 5;56 under section 9
the injured party may pursue his remedy either in a district court57
or by a complaint to the Commission.58 Section 10 provides for criminal
penalties against a carrier; section 5(7) extends these sanctions to in-
dividuals for control violations.59
is to place such carrier and persons affiliated with it, taken together, in control
of another carrier;
(b) if such transaction is by a person affiliated with a carrier, and if the
effect of such transaction is to place such carrier and persons affiliated with it,
taken together, in control of another carrier; [or]
(c) if such transaction is by two or more persons acting together, one of whom
is a carrier or is affiliated with a carrier, and if the effect of such transaction is to
place such persons and carriers and persons affiliated with any one of them and
persons affiliated with any such affiliated carrier, taken together, in control of
another carrier.
49 U.S.C. § 5(5) (1970). The requisite degree of affiliation is defined by § 5(6) as a
relationship of a person to a carrier by reason of which "it is reasonable to believe
that the affairs of any carrier of which control may be acquired by such person will be
managed in the interest of such other carrier." Id. § 5(6).
49 The joint board is chosen pursuant to § 205 of the Act. 49 U.S.C. § 305 (1970).
50 Id. § 5(2)(b).
51 Id. Failure to comply with a condition may not automatically eliminate the
antitrust immunity extended by the Commission's conditioned approval. See Hefler v.
International Air Transp. Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. 73,190 (S.D.N.Y.).
52 49 U.S.C. § 5(4) (1965). However, illegality in the first instance does not prevent
subsequent approval. See East Texas Motor Freight-Control--Consol., 109 M.C.C. 213
(1970).
53 49 U.S.C. § 5(7) (1970).
54 Id. § 5(9). See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (§ 5(9) empowers ICC to supplement acquisition orders, even if supplemented
orders incidentally affect a carrier's certificate).
55 49 U.S.C. § 5(8) (1970).
56 Id. § 8.
57 Id. § 9; see Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry., 1968 Trade Cas. 72,506
(D. Ore. 1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
58 49 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
59 Id. § 5(7). Section 5(1) makes each day of a pooling violation a separate offense for
carriers. Id. § 5(1).
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Section 5(11) relieves the participants from application of the anti-
trust laws, at least for approved transactions, by means of this elaborate
pooling and control approval system:
[A]ny carriers or other corporations, and their officers and em-
ployees and any other persons, participating in a transaction ap-
proved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be
and they are relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws
[both state and federal] . . .6
In the absence of a statutory exemption, control transactions would
normally be subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act61 and would thereby
be prohibited whenever the effect "in any section of the country" was
"to tend to create a monopoly." However, section 7 itself contains
exempting language:
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions
duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the .. . Inter-
state Commerce Commission . . . under any statutory provision
vesting such power in such Commission .... 62
60 Id. § 5(11). This exemption extends not only to participation in the transaction
but also to the preliminaries, including any alleged conspiracy. See Interstate Investors,
Inc. v. Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). As to exemption
from state law, see Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948).
An ambiguity exists on the statute's face as to whether unapproved transactions are
also immune from antitrust attack. The quoted language relieves only those persons
participating in "approved or authorized" transactions. But that same subsection provides
that "[t]he authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary" (49 U.S.C.
§ 5(11) (1970)), and it is unclear whether this provision relates to the Commission's
authority to enforce the entire section by orders and court actions, as previously mentioned,
or whether it relates only to the subsection language immediately succeeding the quote
which exempts a participating or resulting corporation in an approved transaction from
any necessity to obtain state approval. The former interpretation would mean that such
transactions within ICC jurisdiction would never be subject to antitrust attack by third
parties; the latter would suggest a limited exemption which the Commission could grant
or deny. In the case of a denial by a failure to approve, the Commission could proceed
against the parties to a control transaction or pool, and third party plaintiffs could also
challenge them. The Commission has consistently held that there is no exemption until
formal approval. See ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 160 I.C.C. 785, 791 (1930); ICC v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 152 I.C.C. 721, 739-40 (1929); Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Grey-
hound Corp., 104 M.C.C. 524, 555 (1968). The Supreme Court has held similarly in
construing another regulatory statute. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)
(Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.)).
61 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). But Interstate Commerce Act § 5 transactions do not neces-
sarily fall in the Clayton Act § 7 category since they may involve carriers which do not
compete presently or prospectively. Under current law, merging carriers may be restricted
by their certificates to distinct routes, territories, or commodities which do not overlap.
See 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(b) (1970); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S.
133, 14041 (1958).
62 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
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This language remained in the section even following its amendment
in 1950,3 well after the adoption of the ambiguous exempting language
of section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The implication is that
section 7 continues to apply to transactions which are not expressly
authorized by the ICC.
It is apparent that a carrier may be involved in an acquisition or
merger that would not be considered a control transaction within the
meaning of section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, but might fall
within the ambit of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 Even in this case,
however, jurisdiction to enforce section 7 against a regulated carrier
is vested in the ICC. 65 Section 11 of the Clayton Act establishes an
elaborate hearing procedure with an opportunity for intervention by
the Attorney General and any other person showing good cause;€6
however, only the Commission may actually issue a complaint in a
section 11 proceeding, restricted only by the statutory provision that it
"shall issue" upon finding "reason to believe" that a violation has been
committed.67 Thus, even to the extent that unapproved control trans-
actions and other section 7 transactions involving regulated carriers
are subject to section 7, a private third party must rely upon an ICC
hearing rather than an action filed in a district court. The only excep-
tion to this procedure is the suggestion in the proviso to section 16 of
the Clayton Act s8 that the government may be able independently to
obtain injunctive relief.
63 Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
04 This could occur, for example, in a transaction involving an acquisition of multiple
carriers by a holding company (see note 47 supra), in an acquisition by one carrier of
a noncontrol interest in another carrier (see United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 839
F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971)), or in a conglomerate merger involving only one carrier.
15 Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
66 Id; see Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501-02 (1967). The role
played by the Antitrust Division in these proceedings is outlined in Zimmerman, Carrier
Mergers and the Relevance of Antitrust, 34 ICC PpAcroNEas' J. 958 (1967).
67 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
68 [MNothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, . . .
except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any
common carrier, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision,
or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (emphasis added). The section's suggestion by negative implication
of government authorization to sue was accepted in dicta in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern
Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 670 n.20 (1963) (dictum); Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
61 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 288 U.S. 469 (1933) (dictum); Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Mo. 1933), aff'd, 292 U.S. 282
(1934) (dictum). See also Wheeling & L.E. Ry. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 33 F.2d 390 (6th
Cir. 1929). Where the ICC has ruled that it has no jurisdiction, § 16 is no bar to a private
action. See Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255, 261-62 (3d Cir. 1953).
Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970), provides judicial jurisdiction for
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Violations of sections 2 (Robinson-Patman Act price discrimina-
tions) and 3 (tying) of the Clayton Act69 by a regulated carrier are
subject to the same section 11 procedure as are section 7 violations.
However, the nature of a carrier's business makes it unlikely that
those provisions of the antitrust laws would often be relevant. Further-
more, since all government Robinson-Patman cases are in fact brought
by the Federal Trade Commission, which cannot proceed against a
regulated carrier, the likelihood of such cases is further diminished.
A number of horizontal agreements other than pooling arrange-
ments, control transactions, price discriminations, and tying restric-
tions may conceivably violate antitrust policies. The most obvious
are agreements regarding rates, fares, and related considerations,
which would otherwise probably be held illegal per se pursuant to
section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 0 Section 5a,71 added to Part I of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1948,72 expressly sanctions such horizontal
agreements, other than pooling arrangements within the scope of
section 5. 73 Provided that any agreement between carriers relating to
rates, fares, classifications, divisions, allowances, or charges (including
compensation for the use of facilities and equipment) is in "furtherance
of the national transportation policy," and involves only carriers of one
class,74 the Commission is directed to approve such agreement 5 This
such actions; it has been additionally held that § 11 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction
upon a regulatory agency. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). This result
is confirmed by the legislative history of § 11. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1950). But cf. section III(A) infra (discussion of primary jurisdiction).
609 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1970).
70 "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
71 49 id. § 5b.
72 Act of June 17, 1948, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970)). The
Reed-Bulwinkle bill, as this legislation was known, was a direct reaction to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The Court
distinguished its earlier decision in Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), to the
effect that a private party cannot attack ICC-approved rates, on the ground that even if
the rates themselves were lawful, an injunction could issue to prohibit a conspiracy
between carriers to achieve agreed rates since the agreement was not subject to ICC sanction.
73 Parties to any agreement approved by the Commission under this section
and other persons are, if the approval of such agreement is not prohibited by
paragraph (4), (5), or (6) of this section, relieved from the operation of the antitrust
laws with respect to the making of such agreement, and with respect to the
carrying out of such agreement in conformity with its provisions and in conformity
with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commission.
49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1970).
74 The following are considered separate classes: (1) motor carriers; (2) water carriers
and freight forwarders; and (3) railroads, express companies, and sleeping-car companies.
Id. § 5b(4). However, interclass agreements are permissible for joint rates and through
routes. Id.
75 Id. § 5b(2).
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has the effect of granting an exemption from the antitrust laws to
all parties to the agreement.7 5 Unlike the situation with respect to
transactions falling within section 7 of the Clayton Act,76 the antitrust
laws clearly do apply to unapproved agreements of the kind covered
by section 5a.77
Combinations and conspiracies to monopolize in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act78 are not specifically dealt with by the
Interstate Commerce Act other than to the extent that the specific
combinations and agreements previously discussed are immunized.79
Unilateral monopolization and attempts to monopolize as such are also
ignored by the Act.80
The remaining major prohibition of the antitrust laws is section 8
of the Clayton Act,81 which forbids interlocking directorates between
competitors. Interestingly, this section, on its face, is not enforceable
against railroads, which were subjected four years after the passage of
the Clayton Act to the special interlocking directorate provisions of
section 20a(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act.82 However, there is a
76 See notes 61-69 and accompanying text supra.
77 49 U.S.C. § 5b(10) (1965). They also may apply to conspiracies resulting in approved
agreements if they are part of an effort to eliminate competitors. See Riss & Co. v. Associa-
tion of Am. R.Rs., 170 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 861 US. 804 (1959), following
dictum in Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 861 US. 930 (1960).
78 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor ....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); cf. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500
(196) (discriminatory privileges given by carriers are not illegal under Sherman Act
unless symptoms or incidents of conspiracy).
79 See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
80 See Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal.
1966) (motion to stay denied), decided on the merits, 1971 Trade Cas. 73,761 (N.D. Cal.);
notes 98-99 and accompanying text infra.
81 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
No person at the same time shall be director in any two or more corpora-
tions, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating
more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks,
banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers subject to the Act
to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty
seven, if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their
business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competi-
tion by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the
provisions of the antitrust laws.
Id.
82 Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 439, 41 Stat. 494 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20a(12)
(1970)). The Commission may approve interlocks if "neither public nor private interests
will be adversely affected thereby." 49 U.S.C. § 20a(12) (1970). There is no requirement
of a showing of benefit to the public.
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particular ambiguity as to the effect of section 8 of the Clayton Act on
motor carriers. At the time regulated carriers were excluded from the
coverage of section 8, motor carriers were not regulated, and when the
Motor Carrier Act was passed, Congress did not incorporate the section
20a(12) provision into Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.83 Thus,
if regulated motor carriers were not subject to the section 8 prohibition,
their directorates would be entirely unrestricted." On the other hand,
if motor carriers were within section 8, enforcement would be in ac-
cordance with the procedures previously noted for section 7 allega-
tions.85
III
EXEMPTION DOCTRINES
The problems of statutory construction of express exemptions and
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC are not the only grounds for argu-
ment in determining a motor carrier's exposure under the antitrust
laws. Three judicial doctrines are also relevant to this determination:
(1) primary jurisdiction, (2) the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and (3)
the Parker v. Brown doctrine.
A. Primary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction concerns the threshold ques-
tion facing a court as to whether it should consider a pending matter
or should defer the initial determination to an administrative agency.88
In simplest terms, the impact of primary jurisdiction is merely a matter
of priorities, a consideration necessarily present in any judicial action
raising issues which may also properly be considered in a proceeding
before a regulatory agency. This view of the doctrine emphasizes
administrative expertise and the benefits a court derives in deferring
to agency jurisdiction before passing upon specialized questions.87
83 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970).
84 The Clayton Act § 10 requirement of bidding on transactions involving director or
management interlocks would still apply. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970). Section 10 has been con-
sidered by the courts on only six occasions. A good review of its requirements may be
found in the last of those cases, Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1970).
85 See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
88 See K. DAVIS, AnDmNIsrRATrmV LAw 363-79 (2d ed. 1965).
87 See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (dual shipping
rate); cf. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959)
(exculpatory clauses in shipping contracts). It has been recently pointed out that when
the issue is one of construction of the antitrust laws, as opposed to the principal regulatory
responsibilities of an agency, "the courts of the United States [rather than the agencies]
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These assumptions have proven deceptive in many instances. Reliance
upon agency "expertise" has tended to obfuscate the existence of
parochial bias in some situations. The theory of judicial "benefit,"
originally founded upon the anticipation of Commission advice to the
court on complicated and mysterious problems, has instead almost be-
come equated with the recent preoccupation with docket control and
case dispositions. A dismissal of a pending matter on the ground of
primary jurisdiction easily avoids what in most cases promises to be an
extended trial on the merits.
Another rationale for awarding primary jurisdiction to an agency
has been to prevent inconsistency in the enforcement of the agency's
regulatory responsibilities.88 Such an approach to the doctrine under-
estimates the expertise of the courts in resolving factual disputes and
their ability to construe regulatory statutes together with other ap-
plicable law. Both of these activities may in fact provide valuable
assistance and enlightenment to the agencies, and court decrees may be
fashioned so as to avoid or limit troublesome inconsistencies.
The significance of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the anti-
trust context arises from the inherent tension between antitrust and
ICC goals. Clearly, a change in forum for the initial proceeding effec-
tively changes the ground rules and may consequently affect the ulti-
mate outcome.8 9 Furthermore, any change involves considerable delay,°0
have over the years become the repository of antitrust expertise." Thill Sec. Corp. v. New
York Stock Exch., 438 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). This
observation has been endorsed by the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance.
See SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HousE COMM. ON INTERsrATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 2o SESs., SECURrrES INDUsTRY STuDY 165 (1972).
88 See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); cf.
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 859 U.S. 464 (1959); McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards
Co., 298 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1962). But see United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S.
334 (1959); Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). It is of
course a misconception to assume blindly that the ICC promotes consistency in its own
proceedings. See 84 ICC ANN. REP. 80 (1970). Compare Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Pooling,
89 M.C.C. 287 (1943), with Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Evanston Fireproof Ware-
house, 40 M.C.C. 557 (1946). See also text accompanying notes 170-77 infra.
89 Although the Commission must consider competitive effects in its interpretation
of "the public interest," "it is clear that . . . the most relevant consideration is the
national transportation policy, not the antitrust laws." United States v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 389 F. Supp. 554, 557 (D. Colo. 1971); see McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,
821 US. 67, 85-86 (1948). But see Latin America/Pac. Coast S.S. Conference v. FMC,
5 TRADE PE. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 78,995, at 92,185-87 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1972),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 8280 (US. Oct. 24, 1972) (commissions and courts should not have
different attitudes in enforcing the same laws) (dictum); Symposium, "Regulated" Indus-
tries and Antitrust, 82 ANTrrusr LJ. 215, 239-41 (1966).
90 Cf. Walker v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 888, 392 (W.D. Tex. 1962).
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including the possible dismissal of a pending case,91 and may therefore
make a court action impractical, if not impossible.92
ICC preemption of original jurisdiction can have three legal
effects on a judicial proceeding. First, the mere initiation of an ICC
investigation may cause a court to defer to the agency, even without an
initial Commission determination of jurisdiction or a statutory ap-
proval of the alleged violation. 93 Second, an opportunity is created for
the Commission to approve unconsidered transactions and agreements
pursuant to sections 5 and 5a of the Interstate Commerce Act and
thereby to grant immunity to previously vulnerable arrangements. 94
Third, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata may apply
to prohibit different conclusions in subsequent court actions,95 even in
the absence of an express exemption.
The invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in a motot
carrier context is based on several grounds. The nature of the issue is
foremost, and the impact of the doctrine turns upon whether the issue
is one uniquely within the Commission's expertise. The scope of motor
91 Dismissals were ordered in Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570
(1952); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 839 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971); United
States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash. 1952).
92 See also Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 496-99 (1957).
93 Compare United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 339 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971),
with American Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 204 F. Supp.
451 (S.D. Ohio 1962). In the latter case, primary jurisdiction was held applicable regard-
less of whether agency jurisdiction was actually invoked. 204 F. Supp. at 451.
94 See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra. This is true despite the fact that
the carrier's conduct prior to the ICC action violated § 5(4). See Gilbertville Trucking
Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962); Interstate Investors, Inc. v. Transcontinental
Bus Sys., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 421 (N.). Ill. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 457 (1967); East Texas Motor Freight-
Control-Consol., 109 M.C.C. 213 (1970); cf. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,
883 U.S. 213, 222 (1966). Contra, International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. &
Electronics Corp., 5 T, A REG. REP,. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,094, at 92,521-22 (D. Hawaii
July 14, 1972).
95 Cf. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Seatrain Lines,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1953). Justice Harlan implicitly recognized
this principle in United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), where he quoted
Professor Jaffe: "The doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 'more than prescribe the
mere procedural time table of the lawsuit. It is a doctrine allocating the law-making power
over certain aspects' of commercial relations." Id. at 65, quoting Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction
Reconsidered, 102 U. PA. L. Rzv. 577, 583-84 (1954). The estoppel effect is probably
appropriate in the event that a party originally makes his complaint to the ICC pursuant
to §§ 5(7) and 13 (49 U.S.C. §§ 5(7), 13 (1970)); this result is specifically required by § 9
for damage actions, where an ICC or court option is provided to the claimant and the
alternative is barred once he has elected his forum. See note 57 supra. But the statute
does not by its terms so restrict actions for injunctive relief (which may be brought only
by the government), and the courts have judicially created the § 9 effect without providing
an option, comparable to that in § 9, to bring an action in a district court.
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carrier regulation has been construed so broadly in a recent decision
that virtually any antitrust matter is within the purview of the Com-
mission. In United States v. Navajo Freight Lines,96 the district court
dismissed the government's Clayton Act section 7 complaint, which
averred a likely decrease in competition resulting from activities
allegedly not amounting to statutory control, after concluding that
the doctrine [of primary jurisdiction] is properly applied where
there is a dear possibility that the agency may immunize precisely
that conduct which is the basis of the antitrust complaint, or where
the agency... is entrusted with enforcement of the antitrust laws
themselves, even though its immunizing powers do not extend pre-
cisely to the conduct in question.97
Such an approach virtually eliminates all trial court jurisdiction and
restricts the already limited antitrust enforcement available under
the statutes.
The opposite conclusion had been previously reached on a private
monopolization complaint in Marnell v. United Parcel Service of
America, Inc.98 There the court held that the regulatory scheme of the
Interstate Commerce Act was not "all pervasive" and that the ICC was
not empowered to deal with the "essential ingredients" of the conduct
alleged.99 This conclusion can be distinguished from Navajo in that, as
previously noted, the ICC does have concurrent statutory jurisdiction
over the Clayton Act sections 7 and 8 violations alleged, as in Navajo,
while it has no jurisdiction directly to enforce section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which formed the basis of the Marnell complaint.10° Marnell can
96 339 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1971).
97 Id. at 561 (dictum). But cf. note 204 infra.
98 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
99 Id. at 404. Plaintiff charged defendant with monopolistic practices by maintaining
a unique and indispensable service in making, inter alia, C.O.D. deliveries and free deliv-
eries for merchants.
100 Jurisdiction to enforce does not necessarily include authority to exempt or im-
munize. See Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963), where the
Court dismissed a government Sherman Act complaint on the ground that the Civil
Aeronautics Board had responsibility for enforcing a statutory provision (Federal Aviation
Act § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970)) similar to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)), even though the CAB could not "approve" and thereby exempt
activities violating that standard. This finding approaches a determination of exclusive
rather than primary jurisdiction. With respect to other agencies in other cases, however,
the Court has rejected the argument that a regulatory scheme is so "pervasive" as to
displace completely the antitrust laws. See California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC); United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188 (1939) (Dep't of Agriculture). Significantly, that view has been applied to the
Interstate Commerce Act by lower courts. See Denver Union Stockyards Co. v. Denver Live
Stock Comm'n Co., 404 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969).
See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Riss & Co., 267 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In Riss
19721
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:90
also be distinguished from Navajo on the ground that ICC approval
of a carrier's rates may not statutorily grant an exemption from charges
of unilateral monopolization in the use of those rates, while it is con-
ceivable that Commission action in Navajo could immunize the carrier
from the precise section 7 charge in the government's suit.
The Navajo opinion details an analogy between ICC and Civil
Aeronautics Board jurisdiction and is thereby able to place reliance
upon the decision in Pan American World Airways v. United States'0'
as to the pervasiveness of the immunity effect under the statutes. It is
regrettable that the Navajo court used language, albeit dicta, that went
beyond previous standards for use of the doctrine. 10 2 It is also difficult
to understand why even the second legal issue in Navajo (legislative
intent concerning the application of section 8 to motor carriers) was
deferred to the Commission.10 3 An appeal was filed and dismissed'0 4
it was held that primary jurisdiction did not apply to the question of immunity for rate
reductions when such reductions were only a small part of a large number of overt acts
alleged as part of a conspiracy. The rule developed was that the effect of ICC approvals
should be deferred to the Commission where the approved actions are the dominant or sole
issue in the case but not where there are many issues and there is an interest in avoiding
delay. Id. at 658.
101 371 U.S. 296 (1963). But see Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Cargo, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas.
73,775 (S.D.N.Y.), narrowly construing the immunity granted by a prior CAB authoriza-
tion and denying primary jurisdiction.
102 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
103 See also notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra. A recent opinion reviewing a
Federal Power Commission proceeding has proposed a novel twist which could be relevant
in the motor carrier-antitrust area: so far as antitrust issues are concerned, the agency
"may even, indeed, defer its disposition pending determination of relevant court litigation
.... This would be in effect a reverse application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
a doctrine that has been appropriately referred to as supple and flexible." LaFayette v.
FPC, 1971 Trade Cas. 73,730, at 91,053 (D.C. Cir.).
104 Notice of appeal filed sub nom. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1972) (No. 950), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
Ironically, the appeal was filed by the company which was the object of its competitor's
control effort and a nominal defendant, and the Department of Justice urged the Court
to dismiss, apparently acquiescing in the ICC's primary jurisdiction. The government's
motion to affirm explained this reversal in terms of the Commission's investigation com-
mencing only after the filing of the complaint in the district court which, under the
circumstances, was "appropriately instituted" in the face of agency inaction. Motion of
the United States to Affirm, at 5 (filed March 14, 1972) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
However, the implication that the purpose of a court action is to spur Commission pro-
ceedings is questionable in view of the Department's ability to initiate an investigation by
direct approach to the ICC. Cf. text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
Other courts have recently disagreed on the applicability of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine in comparable regulatory contexts. The Seventh Circuit applied the doctrine to
affirm the dismissal of a private Sherman Act complaint against the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 414 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
405 U.S. 953, motion to reconsider denied, 405 U.S. 984 (1972). The Second Circuit, how-
ever, expressly declined to follow that lead in denying a motion to stay in an action against
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on a procedural ground, thereby failing to shed any light on these
issues.
The position of the ICC in primary jurisdiction disputes is one
generally shared by every regulatory agency. It is, to be blunt, a ques-
tion of pride masquerading in terms of professionalism, thoroughness,
experience, and responsibility. A more cynical view would suggest a
desire to extend a protective blanket over constituents. 10 5 This natural
tendency was perhaps most recently exhibited by Securities and Ex-
change Commission Chairman Casey's recommendation that securities
antitrust problems be referred by the federal courts to his Commis-
sion.10 6 The response of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Chairman of
the Senate Securities Subcommittee, ironically points up one of the
traditional problems of the transportation industry: 'Without the spur
provided by diligent application and enforcement of the antitrust laws,
the incentives to modernization and efficiency through the operation
of competitive forces. . . would be greatly reduced."'' 07
the New York Produce Exchange. See Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., BNA ANrrusr
& TRADE Er. REP., No. 538, Nov. 16, 1971, at A-6, A-7 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Supreme Court did not apply primary jurisdiction in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 374 U.S. 821 (1963), where banking agencies were required to consider
competitive effects before their approval of a merger. The question of primary jurisdiction
has again been submitted to the Court, this time involving a dispute between the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Maritime Commission. See United States v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp. 656 (D.N.J.), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 937 (1971). In that mat-
ter the Solicitor General was required to state the opposing views of his two clients in a
single memorandum. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3-10. See also Latin America/
Pac. Coast S.S. Conference v. FMC, 5 TRADE REa. RE'. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,995 (D.C.
Cir. May 10, 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1972); Seatrain Lines, Inc.
v. FMC, 460 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June
27, 1972) (No. 1647).
105 See Loevinger, Regulation and Competition as Alternatives, 11 ANvrraUSr BULL.
101, 122-23 (1966).
100 BNA ANrrmusT & TRADE REG. RE., No. 530, Sept. 21, 1971, at A-22.
107 BNA ANTrrrusr & TRADE REG. R ., No. 531, Sept. 28, 1971, at A-21. The Antitrust
Division opposed a motion of the New York Stock Exchange for a federal district court
to refer a pending suit against the Exchange to the SEC. The SEC intervened at the sug-
gestion of the court of appeals, and the Antitrust Division noted that the Comission's
participation was adequate for it to inform the court on regulatory considerations. Thill
Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971); see BNA ANrrrTRsT & TRADE ERG. RP., No. 546, Jan. 18, 1972, at A-7.
On remand in March 1972, the district court denied primary jurisdiction on the ground
that the securities laws are not sufficiently "pervasive" to require referral. 5 TRADE EG.
RE'. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,903, at 91,745 (E.D. Wis. March 13, 1972). A similar order
staying all proceedings pending a requested report from an administrative agency was
entered in response to a motion of the government in United States v. Board of Trade,
5 TRADE REG. RP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,831 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1972). See also Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n, Inc., 253 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 930 (1960).
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B. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a judicially fashioned exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. Whereas the exempting effect of primary
jurisdiction is a secondary consequence of other judicial priorities, the
purpose of the Noerr-Pennington principle is the frank recognition of
an immune area of possible anticompetitive activity.
In 1961 the Supreme Court announced in Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.08 that "no violation of
the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws." 10 9 The Court extended this hold-
ing to the conclusion that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or
more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a
law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly."" 0
The apparent rationale for this policy was a combination of the
constitutional right to petition the government and the government's
inherent authority to restrain competition through legislation and law
enforcement. This justification for certain concerted actions by com-
petitors was expressed more clearly four years later in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington,"' where the Court rejected a test
based on good faith:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such con-
duct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."12
Thus, the primary purpose for seeking governmental action might be
either to obtain a legitimate regulation or restriction (for example,
safety) with anticompetitive side effects or to achieve the elimination
of a competitor. The latter was clearly the case in the Pennington
situation. 31
Some commentators feel that the presence of formalized regulatory
controls somehow compensates for the opportunities provided by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine for joint action by competitors; this opinion
manifests a narrow reading of the cases to apply only in regulated
contexts.114 The doctrine is, however, particularly potent in a regu-
108 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
109 Id. at 135.
110 Id. at 136.
11 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
112 Id. at 670.
113 See id. at 669-70.
114 See, e.g., Costilo, The Scope of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 34 ANrrnusr L.J.
141, 151-54 (1967).
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latory scheme in which there is an identifiable agency with specific
authority to control competitive relationships. Given the efficacy of
the doctrine in this context, it is therefore not surprising to find a
number of decisions fitting within the latter framework."I5
For a variety of considerations, it seems more appropriate to re-
strict the exemption as it pertains to efforts encouraging administrative
interference and to provide slightly more leeway for legislative lobby-
ing.16 First, lobbying as a practical matter requires concerted effort;
second, legislation is commonly one step further removed from actual
restraint than is administrative action; and third, the diversity of legis-
lators' viewpoints may well necessitate a more meritorious argument to
achieve a favorable decision than would be required to convince a less
disinterested or perhaps even favorably disposed agency. This view
may amount to a judgment that legislation is inherently political,
while agency regulation should ideally be apolitical. But surely, politi-
cal participation, recognized as such, should be more squarely within
the Noerr-Pennington sphere. The Court stated in Noerr that the anti-
trust laws must be limited to regulation of "business activity," and can-
not extend to "political activity."' 17 It has recently recognized that the
right to petition, underlying legislative political activity, also "governs
the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies
(which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive)
and to courts.""" However, this recognition should not detract from
the realization that the degree of politics involved in a citizen's rela-
tionship with the legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial
branches of government should proceed across that spectrum in a
115 See, e.g., Association of W. Rys. v. Riss & Co., 299 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (efforts
by railroads, railroad associations, and a public relations firm to influence legislative and
administrative action to destroy or hamper trucking competition did not violate Sherman
Act); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line N.Y. Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (allegation in complaint that bus companies had engaged in lobbying
activities to enact legislation to hinder competition was not within scope of Sherman Act
and was subject to motion to strike); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
196 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (claim that plaintiff had propagandized and influenced
ICC to promulgate favorable rulings on per diem rental rates did not preclude enforce-
ment of rental agreements made pursuant to rulings).
116 Although Noerr involved combined regulatory-legislative activities and Pennington
was a regulatory case, the pure legislative exemption has been followed in a number of
decisions. See, e.g., Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n,
272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
117 865 US. at 137 (dictum); cf. Barnett, Joint Action by Competitors To Influence
Public Officials: Antitrust Exemption or Trap?, 24 Bus. LAw. 1097 (1969).
118 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 US. 508, 510 (1972)
(dictum).
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sharply declining order of magnitude. Hopefully, the application of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will diminish in similar proportions. 19
There is reason to believe the courts have recoiled from the havoc
loosed by Noerr-Pennington. The Noerr opinion itself excepted "sham"
appeals to government action in situations where there "is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified."'20 This "sham" exception has been used in a variety
of dissimilar cases to avoid application of the doctrine.
In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,1 21
a summary judgment for the defendant was reversed in a treble damage
action on the ground that Noerr-Pennington did not apply to a com-
petitor's business relations with "public officials engaged in purely
commercial dealings"' 22 rather than with policy makers. In Paddock
Pool the parties were competitors seeking to sell swimming pools to
public bodies, most of whom retained architects to prepare bid specifi-
cations. The First Circuit held that one competitor's efforts to obtain
architectural adoption of specifications qualifying only the products
of that competitor did not "rise to the dignity of an effort to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws."' 23 Paddock Pool seems to read into
the sham rule most dealings with the government in its proprietary
capacity.124
In Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150,125
the Ninth Circuit rejected a labor union's assertion of a Noerr-Penning-
ton defense to a private conspiracy action. The court reversed a judg-
ment on the pleadings for defendant and held that protected com-
119 It is a hopeful sign that the Court has not adopted an early suggestion to ground
the doctrine on the first amendment right to freedom of speech. See The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REy. 40, 199 (1961); cf. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1972), where the Court distinguished first amendment
cases. Such an approach would hold out little prospect of judicial self-limitation of the
doctrine's application.
120 365 U.S. at 144.
121 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
122 424 F.2d at 33.
123 Id. at 32.
124 Dealing with governmental entities as potential customers or business associates
is decidedly different from seeking regulatory relief or assistance from the government in
its law-making capacity. The Paddock Pool court did not allow the label "government"
to refute a single business transaction. Id. at 32-33. See also Twin City Sportservice, Inc.
v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,150, at 92,798 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 1972). But see United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), which the government did not appeal.
125 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
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munications could not include threats, intimidation, and coercion of
public officials. 126 There can be no argument that such tactics are
legitimate appeals to governmental discretion or valid "political ac-
tivity" which should be immunized as a matter of policy.
A third variation on the sham exception is the knowing presen-
tation or communication of false information to induce governmental
action. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Company
of America,127 the Fifth Circuit may have expanded the sham excep-
tion to include all false or misleading representations on the theory
that such information can only be intended to thwart effective de-
cision making by abusing the administrative process. Such an inter-
pretation of the Woods holding would run counter to the explicit lan-
guage in Noerr that "deception, reprehensible as it is," is still within
the scope of the immunity.128 The petition for certiorari in Woods un-
successfully attempted to establish this apparent conflict.129
Another approach taken toward restrictive application of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine has been to distinguish existing decisions. This
has the effect of allowing the exception only under certain limited
conditions and works to prevent greater expansion of the doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit followed this course in Trucking Unlimited v. Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Co.180 in its reversal of the district court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The complaint alleged a conspiracy of motor com-
mon carriers jointly to oppose before the California Public Utilities
Commission, the ICC, and the courts all applications for the issuance,
transfer, or registration of operating rights by actual and potential
competitors. 131 Although the court of appeals recognized the applica-
bility of the sham exception to the facts alleged, it based its conclusion
126 440 F.2d at 1099.
127 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (antitrust immunity
unjustified when gas producers filed false reports with state railroad commission so as to
reduce production allowables of other producers).
128 365 U.S. at 145. The "falsehood" expansion of the sham exception was explicitly
rejected by the Federal Trade Commission in early 1971 in a negative response to a request
for an investigation of a deceptive advertising campaign. See BNA AN=Rusr & TRADE PEaG.
REP., No. 504, March 16, 1971, at E-1. The FTC's letter to the complainant stated:
Even assuming a wrongful motive . .. and the willful use of distortion or
deception, it is our view that actionable violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act is
not indicated due to the overriding public interest in preservation of uninhibited
communication in connection with political activity ....
Id. at E-2.
129 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20-21.
130 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298 (N.D. Cal.). The Su-
preme Court affirmed the court of appeals on other grounds, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
131 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298, at 84,789.
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primarily upon a construction of the doctrine which denied its ap-
plication to
judicial and administrative adjudicative processes .... It is not
the function of the courts to determine whether laws restraining
trade will be adopted or, having been adopted, whether they will
be enforced; nor is this the function of an administrative agency
engaged in adjudication .... 132
Although the Supreme Court affirmed Trucking Unlimited, it did
so on the alternative ground that the plaintiff-respondent might be able
to meet the sham exception on remand for trial.133 Justice Douglas's
opinion brushed away the adjudicatory argument in four sentences,
stating in part:
It would be destructive of rights of association and of petition
to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violat-
ing the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and
federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of
view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests
vis-a-vis their competitors.134
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart is even more explicit in its
reliance on the sham theory.13 5
The Supreme Court opinion in Trucking Unlimited did not con-
sider either the proprietary function rationale of Paddock Pool'36 or
the coercion premise of Teamsters Local 150.137 But it did treat the
false information concept 38 in a curious way, over the protest of two
132 432 F.2d at 758; accord, United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54
(D. Minn. 1971), enforced, 5 TaDE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,791 (D. Minn. Nov. 10,
1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Feb. 15, 1972) (No. 991).
'3 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 (1972).
The sham exception was again relied upon when a summary judgment for defendants
was reversed in Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,983
(D.C. Cir. May 17, 1972). It was also relied upon in a private action filed in May 1972 by
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation against a competitor. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., Civil No. 72-17 (M.D. Fla., filed May 16, 1972),
summarized in BNA ANmusr & TRADE R c. RE., No. 564, May 23, 1972, at A-10.
134 404 U.S. at 510-11.
135 I]he respondents are entitled to prove that the real intent of the con-
spirators was not to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and
courts, but to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking
those processes. Such an intent would make the conspiracy "an attempt to inter-
fere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application
of the Sherman Act would be justified."
Id. at 518 (emphasis in original), quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
136 See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
137 See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
188 404 U.S. at 512-13.
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concurring Justices, who pointed out that allegations of false informa-
tion did not appear in the complaint.13 9 After rejecting the primary
basis for the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court modified that rejection
with the gratuitous statement that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in
the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process." 140 In sum, the adjudication distinction of Noerr was not
totally cast aside, and the false information aspect of the sham exception
was not totally accepted. As a result, the Court may well have to
consider these problems again. 141
Trucking Unlimited did establish one principle firmly. The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is, as suggested in the language of Noerr,14 2 subject
to a sham exception when the appeal to a governmental body is
not intended to invoke the governmental process to achieve a desired
result indirectly but, rather, is intended to interfere directly with
the competitor's business. In Trucking Unlimited the conspirators did
not seek regulatory restriction on competition; instead they sought to
prohibit access by competitors to regulatory agencies-a practical
necessity-by greatly increasing the cost of successful prosecution of an
application by a competitor. This conduct was condemned.143
C. Parker v. Brown
In Parker v. Brown,144 the Supreme Court announced that the
antitrust laws were not designed to restrain state action.145 Parker
involved a raisin growers' private marketing program adopted pursuant
to a California statute establishing market and price controls. Although
the state legislation in question paralleled the federal Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which was in derogation of statutory antitrust policies,
the opinion did not dwell on this narrow point. Nor did it emphasize
139 Id. at 517 (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
140 Id. at 513.
141 Curiously, by the simultaneous denial of certiorari in the Woods case (404 U.S.
1047 (1972)) at the time of announcement of the Trucking Unlimited decision, the Court
avoided an immediate examination of this ambiguity. It is obvious that the Court
was conscious of the possible interrelationship, for the ambiguity was noted in questions
from the bench at oral argument. See BNA ANinRUSr & TRADE REG. REP., No. 538, Nov.
16, 1971, at A-2 to A-5.
142 qee note 120 supra.
143 See also United States v. American Natural Gas Co., 206 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill.
1962). Trucking Unlimited has been cited in a subsequent decision turning on joint action
(to obtain state enforcement of a licensing law) as clearly supporting an exemption in
the absence of "misuse or corruption of the legal process." Senike v. Enid Automobile
Dealers Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 78,892, at 91,708 (10th Cir. March
13, 1972).
144 317 US. 341 (1943).
145 Id. at 350.
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the fact that the California law imposed a regulatory scheme. Rather,
the Court acknowledged that California's prorate program would violate
the Sherman Act if fostered by individuals, and indeed that the federal
government could, under the commerce power, prohibit programs such
as California's. However, the Court held that there is "nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature."'146
The Parker doctrine is the natural complement to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. The latter immunizes the seeking of govern-
mental action; the former immunizes the governmental action itself. 47
It is of course possible for a situation to involve only one of the doc-
trines. An incipient inducement of governmental action involves only
a Noerr-Pennington issue, and an unsolicited governmental action
benefiting a competitor involves reliance solely on Parker. But the
usual case, where a competitor has been successful in obtaining some
beneficial governmental involvement in a competitive relationship, will
raise both issues.
Under the Parker doctrine, the opportunities open to a regulated
competitor such as a carrier are evident. For ICC regulation the
doctrine is not directly applicable; 148 the same result is achieved through
federal statutory exemption and primary jurisdiction. But most carriers
remain to a degree subject to state public utilities commission regula-
tion and other state control. The Parker doctrine provides at a mini-
mum the equivalent of federal statutory exemption for state laws.
In two recent cases, regulated utilities successfully invoked the
doctrine in defense to private actions by competitors. The Fifth Circuit
in Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.149 applied the traditional version
146 Id. at 350-51.
147 The broad language of Parker, akin to sovereign immunity, has been seized upon
in subsequent antitrust actions by a proliferation of defendants seeking to come under the
umbrella of a government or public authority. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp.
v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. RE. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,094, at
92,534-35 (D. Hawaii July 14, 1972) ("approval" of merger by state public utilities com-
mission does not cloak merger with immunity).
148 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972). In Hecht the court did consider the merits of the "state action" issue
even though the administrative body involved was a creature of Congress and not a state
agency. This distinction was entirely ignored in Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v.
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 73,878, at 91,661-62
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 1972), where the defendants unsuccessfully argued for immunity under
a federal milk marketing order.
149 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), rehearing denied,
405 U.S. 969 (1972).
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of the doctrine to immunize promotional programs which had pre-
viously been approved by orders of the state regulatory agency. How-
ever, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 50
the Fourth Circuit went well beyond previous notions of exemption by
finding state action in implied consent through failure of a state agency
to consider the challenged practice. The scope of this expansion of
Parker is highlighted by the revelation that seven years after commence-
ment of the utility's program, which was challenged in the private case,
the state regulatory commission had prohibited further activities in its
first consideration of the practices. The court chided the plaintiff for
its failure to protest to the agency earlier and announced that the
Parker doctrine applies to all violations "within the ambit of regula-
tion," whether or not regulation occurs.151 Clearly, the Virginia Electric
decision equating state action with administrative acquiescence or even
ignorance stretches Parker to the breaking point.152
The Fifth Circuit panel in the Georgia Power case distinguished
the prior holding of another panel of that court in Woods Exploration
& Producing Co. v. Aluminum Company of America,15 which had
refused to apply the Parker doctrine to a state commission's orders
controlling natural gas production. The Woods holding presented
two propositions. First, it contradicted the Virginia Electric position
by stating that all private action within a state regulatory framework is
not ipso facto state action, even where state remedies specifically apply
150 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); accord, Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 5 TRADE RaG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,008 (E.D. Va. March 14, 1972) (dictum).
151 438 F.2d at 252.
152 Accord, International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp.,
5 TRADE Ra. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,094, at 92,537 n.129 (D. Hawaii July 14, 1972)
(dictum). But since the decision in Virginia Electric, a district court has found agency
ignorance without notice from a competitor to be within the scope of the Parker v.
Brown doctrine. Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 5 TRADE REG.
RaP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,008 (E.D. Va. March 14, 1972) (dictum). A recent landmark
class action decision, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 5 TRADE REaG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,926 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 1972), has cast doubt on the logic of granting exemption despite
a finding of nonregulation. There the defendant odd-lot traders and the New York Stock
Exchange argued immunity and/or primary jurisdiction of the SEC on the grounds that
regulation of odd-lot trading was within the scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970)) and the self-regulatory powers of the Exchange pursuant
to that Act. Judge Tyler stated:
[I]f the Exchange had exercised its self-regulatory powers by establishing rules in
respect to odd-lot differentials, I would assume arguendo that review of such rules
might be beyond the powers of this court. But the Exchange, by its own admission,
failed to eatablish any rules or regulations with regard to odd-lot differentials. To
put the matter bluntly, it is unlikely that this failure or "benign acquiescence"
can be considered to constitute regulation mandated by the Act.
Id. at 91,852.
153 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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to the defendant's conduct. Second, in light of a finding that de-
fendants supplied false information to a regulatory body, the court
refuted the presumption of state action: "[D]efendants' conduct here
can in no way be said to have become merged with the action of the
state since the Commission neither was the real decision maker [because
it had to rely on defendants for its operative data] nor would have
intended its order to be based on false facts."'" The Georgia Power
panel did not embrace the first aspect of the Woods holding but main-
tained its neutrality by finding it unnecessary to go as far as Virginia
Electric. The absence of allegations of falsehood in Georgia Power was
considered distinction enough.
Another decision squarely in conflict with the spirit of Virginia
Electric and distinguished on its facts by Georgia Power is George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 55 where the First
Circuit refused to exempt the action of a public official or agent when
that action served to undermine the purpose of state law. 56 In Paddock
Pool the defendant engaged in an elaborate program to have experts
hired by public bodies include the defendant's unique specifications in
bid terms adopted by those public bodies. Even though the act of recom-
mendation was that of a quasi-official and the act of promulgation of
the anticompetitive requirement was that of a governmental unit, the
court found both acts to be inconsistent with the underlying purpose
of the bidding law authorizing the actions. Because that law's purpose
was consistent with the antitrust laws, the Parker doctrine was inap-
plicable since the state action was not intended to diminish competitive
standards. The Paddock Pool court would recognize as within the am-
bit of the Parker doctrine only government action which "deliberately
attempts to provide an alternate form of public regulation."' 57
Whether challenged activities constitute genuine state action is
essentially a factual inquiry to be determined on a case by case basis.
Although the emphasis on particular facts may vary, most decisions
are basically efforts to determine whether the pattern is state action
with ancillary private participants or "individual action masquerading
154 438 F.2d at 1295. But see Okefenokee Rural Elec. Memb. Corp. v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954). The status of false information under the
Noerr doctrine may be somewhat higher than it appears to be for Parker doctrine
purposes. See text accompanying notes 127-29, 138-41 supra. One court has attributed this
shift in standards to the "First Amendment overtones" of Noerr. George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1970). But see note
119 supra.
155 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
156 See notes 121-24 and accompanying text supra.
'57 424 F.2d at 30.
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as state action."'158 The degree of antitrust zeal of a court will usually
show in its examination of the facts and the weight accorded to each in
the balance.
A point more fundamental to the allowance of an exemption than
the mere finding of state action was raised in Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc.159 Where entirely legitimate state action does in fact exist, the
inquiry should not end with an assumption of immunity under Parker
v. Brown, but should proceed to consider whether the state action may
continue without contravening federal antitrust laws, which, under
the federal commerce power, constitutionally take precedence over
state legislation.16 0 The original state action in Parker was impliedly
authorized by another federal statute. It may well be that Parker v.
Brown authorizes an exemption only for state actions consistent with
auxiliary federal policies or those regulating areas specifically allocated
to state control. The distinction between private action and govern-
mental action for exemption purposes probably involves a second and
more subtle distinction between governmental action and constitu-
tionally permissible governmental action. A simple use of labels will
not suffice.
Iv
EXEMPTIONS IN ACTION
Through the statutory and judge-made exemption structure, regu-
lated carriers have been provided a considerable area in which to
maneuver subject only to the exercise of ICC and, in some respects,
state agency discretion. That freedom from antitrust constraints-and
from antitrust enforcers, both public and private-is all the more valu-
able because of the concomitant protection from natural competitive
restrictions. The ICC and state agencies control not only the antitrust
reins but also the impact of competitive factors such as new entry,
internal expansion over new routes, consolidation of carriers, diversifi-
cation of carrier business, common ownership between carrier modes,
and rates. Manifestly, under the current state of the law, the exercise of
agency discretion and the standards for review of that discretion will
determine the competitive atmosphere of the motor carrier industry.
158 Ashville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959).
See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
159 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
160 Id. at 935; accord, International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics
Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 74,094, at 92,537 (D. Hawaii July 14, 1972).
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Other government and private efforts, not including legislative pro-
posals, have not often been successful; they have at most been minor
irritants to the industry.
An examination of the history of ICC policies is not encouraging
for those urging a resurrection of competitive incentives. A study
of judicial review is even more sobering in view of the anticipation
aroused by the much heralded devotion of the courts to competition
and the antitrust laws as our economic keystones. Instead of such
devotion, one finds persistent deference to the Commission and casual
lip service paid to antitrust doctrine as an element of the public interest.
The most accessible area in which to explore these developments is that
of Interstate Commerce Act section 5 control proceedings. These pro-
ceedings involve the exercise of considerable Commission discretion.
They are often of sufficient magnitude to require an elaboration of the
Commission's views and judicial review, and they are readily recogniz-
able as merger and acquisition transactions otherwise squarely within
the prohibitions of, inter alia, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The approach of the ICC and the Supreme Court after the last
significant legislative action in 1940161 is best exemplified in the Court's
1944 decision in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States.162 The Com-
mission had approved an application to consolidate eight motor carriers
over the objections of the Antitrust Division and a competing motor
carrier, among others. The competitor challenged that approval, and
one of the issues before the Court was whether "due weight" had been
given to antitrust policies.
The combination of carriers in McLean eliminated direct com-
petition between them over more than a third of their route-miles; the
resulting motor carrier became the largest in the country at that time.
The Court realized that "no other single motor carrier [would] compete
with it throughout its service area."'163 In its approval of the applica-
tion, the ICC had expressed a clear intention to encourage such con-
solidations to conform trucking to its railroad model.16
161 See notes 34-35 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
162 321 U.S. 67 (1944), aff'g 48 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'g Associated Transp., Inc.
-Control & Consol.-Arrow Carrier Corp., 38 M.C.C. 137 (1942).
163 321 U.S. at 71.
164 The legislative history of section 5 indicates a clear Congressional intent to
encourage unifications, particularly of railroads. In view of the national trans-
portation policy, as declared in the act, it can not be supposed that Congress
intended that the motor-carrier industry, a coordinate and competing form of
transportation, should not also be permitted to grow through consolidations, or
that the mere size of the consolidated company should, of itself, be sufficient to
warrant denial. Considering the much greater number of motor carriers of prop-
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The Court refused to disapprove, by recognizing a distinction in
the statutory history for application of section 5 to railroads and to
motor carriers, the ICC's application of the same theory to two different
modes of transportation.1 5 The opinion conceded in a footnote that
"[a]uthorization of consolidation of rail carriers stems historically from
circumstances different from those impelling the authorization of con-
solidation of motor carriers," and "[t]his difference in origins is not
entirely to be ignored simply because the same provisions of § 5 now
govern both motor carrier and rail carrier consolidations." 1 6 Nonethe-
less, there was no recognition that this difference might be incorporated
into the provision of the National Transportation Policy directing
regulation so as to "preserve the inherent advantages of each" mode. 67
Having reached the conclusion that motor carriers were to be
economically treated as fledgling railroads, the Court made its now
classic pronouncement on the Commission's role:
Congress however neither has made the anti-trust laws wholly
inapplicable to the transportation industry nor has authorized the
Commission in passing on a proposed merger to ignore their policy.
Congress recognized that the process of consolidating motor car-
riers would result in some diminution of competition and might
result in the creation of monopolies. To prevent the latter effect
and to make certain that the former was permitted only where ap-
propriate to further the national transportation policy, it placed in
the Commission power to control such developments .... Hence,
the fact that the carriers participating in a properly authorized
consolidation may obtain immunity from prosecution under the
anti-trust laws in no sense relieves the Commission of its duty, as
an administrative matter, to consider the effect of the merger on
competitors and on the general competitive situation in the in-
dustry in the light of the objectives of the national transportation
policy.
erty and their size as compared with railroads generally, the need for unification
in the trucking field is at least as great as in the case of railroads, which have had
many years of development and now comprise comparatively few systems.
Associated Transp., Inc.-Control & Consol.-Arrow Carrier Corp., 38 M.C.C. 13, 162-63
(1942). It is not difficult to imagine the frustration the Antitrust Division must have felt
at such reasoning.
The Commission had begun its administration of motor carrier regulation with
more moderate views, over Chairman Eastman's dissents. See, e.g., Richmond-Greyhound
Lines, Inc.-Control-Peninsula Transit Corp., 35 M.C.C. 555 (1940); Northland-Grey-
hound Lines, Inc.-Purchase--Menzo M. Liederbach, 5 M.C.C. 123 (1937). These views were
quickly reversed upon the Commission's reconsideration of the same cases. Richmond-
Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control-Peninsula Transit Corp., 36 M.C.C. 747 (1941); North-
land-Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase--Menzo M. Liederbach, 25 M.C.C. 109 (1939).
165 321 U.S. at 78-79, 80-85.
106 Id. at 85 n.22.
167 49 U.S.C. preceding §§ 1, 301, 901, 1001 (1971).
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise
the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from
the proposed consolidation and consider them along with the ad-
vantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to
determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the
over-all transportation policy. Resolving these considerations is a
complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment
and considerable knowledge of the transportation industry. Con-
gress left that task to the Commission .... 168
Justice Douglas's dissenting plea, that the Court exercise restraint in
the motor carrier area until otherwise ordered by Congress, was
ignored.169
The ICC and its constituents quickly realized what the Court
had done for the motor carrier industry. Illustrative is the development
of the Allied Van Lines system. In 1942 a group of several hundred
motor carriers of household goods applied to the Commission pursuant
to section 5(1) for authority to pool their intercity business and to
constitute Allied as their joint agent to conduct that business. That
application was denied °70 After the McLean decision in January 1944,
a new application was filed patterned after the McLean transaction.
In Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Evanston Fireproof Ware-
house,'7 the Commission approved the consolidation of 325 household
goods carriers and related operations through an exchange of shares
with Allied.
This turnabout is even more revealing when viewed in the light
of intervening circumstances. The Antitrust Division, which had op-
posed both ICC applications, had filed a Sherman Act action between
the first and second applications of the carriers, alleging violations
of sections 1 and 2. A consent decree entered in that matter in 1945
prohibited most of the consolidating carriers from, among other things,
entering into any combination with each other.17 2 This decree did not
occasion any pause in the Commission's conclusion; it noted that
"[i]t is well settled that if we approve and authorize a transaction under
section 5, the parties to the transaction, by virtue of the application
168 321 U.S. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
169 Douglas warned that
a pattern of consolidation will have been approved which will allow the cartel
rather than the competitive system to dominate this field. History shows that it is
next to impossible to turn back the clock once such a trend gets under way.
321 US at 94-95 (dissenting opinion). History has shown that his prediction was correct.
See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 88-92.
170 Allied Van Lines, Inc.--Pooling, 39 M.C.C. 287 (1943).
171 40 M.C.C. 557 (1946).
172 For a discussion of this unreported case, see id. at 585-86.
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of section 5(11), are relieved from the prohibitions of the antitrust
laws to the extent of their authorized participation."1 73
In approving the Allied merger, the ICC spent most of its analysis
weighing improved operating efficiencies against the impact on com-
petitors. These factors continued to be the predominant considerations
in later proceedings; attention to shippers' views has been noticeably
skimpy. 74 Even in its evaluation of impact on competing carriers, the
Commission appears to employ a "squeaky wheel gets the grease" rule.
This emphasis was deplored by Commissioner Arpaia in his dissent in
Transcon Lines-Purchase-B & M Express, Inc..7 5 The majority had
placed considerable weight on the lack of vigorous opposition, while
the dissenting opinion urged the assumption of a more difficult burden
of proof by the applicant. 78 The majority's attitude has normally
prevailed.177
The next major Supreme Court review of carrier exemptions came
in 1959. Having determined in McLean that motor and rail carriers
are subject to essentially the same standards, the Court affirmed the
ICC's approval and a three judge district court's affirmance of a disputed
railroad control transaction in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.
v. United States.178 The district court's initial review rejected the
proposition that the Commission should have weighed any violations of
the antitrust laws against pro-public interest findings. It held that only
"the effect of the acquisition on competing carriers and the possible
curtailment of competition" needed consideration, rather than whether
the acquisition would have in any way violated an antitrust statute in
the absence of an exemption. 179
'73 Id. at 587 (citing McLean).
174 Compare Pacific Intermountain Express Co.-Control & Purchase-Keeshin
Freight Lines, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 341 (1950), aff'd on rehearing, 57 M.C.C. 467 (1951), with
Transcon Lines--Purchase-B & M Express, Inc., 70 M.C.C. 769 (1958), rev'd on rehearing,
75 M.C.C. 693 (1959). See also Ringsby-Control, 58 M.C.C. 594 (1952); Hale, The Regula-
tion of Motor Carriers, 19 A.B.A. ANTrrausr SECrxoN 889, 389-90 (1961).
175 75 M.C.C. 693, 701 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
176 Id. at 702; accord, SNATE COMM. ON SMALL BusisESs, MERGERS AND CONCENTRA-
TION IN Tim TRUCKING INDusTRY, S. RaP. No. 1441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958).
177 But see Watson-Control, 57 M.C.C. 745, 758 (1951).
178 361 U.S. 173 (1959), aff'g 165 F. Supp. 893 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'g Toledo, P. & W.
R.R. Control, 295 I.C.C. 523 (1957).
179 Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 893, 900 (D. Minn. 1958).
The court read McLean to have decided that
[i]t is not the function of the Commission to determine whether the acquisition
of Western by these two railroads will violate the antitrust laws. The Com-
mission has not attempted to do so and can make no definitive decision as to
whether or not the contemplated transaction will result in a restraint of trade or
a monopoly which is forbidden by law.
Id. at 899. The scope of review of the narrow ICC equation was also quite limited:
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The Supreme Court did not take a position on whether the
district court's "reasons and legal conclusions" were all correct. 80 Nor
did it repeat the lower court's analysis. Instead it concentrated on
extensive quotation from its opinion in McLean. Consequently, it
remained undetermined whether the McLean conclusion that "there
can be little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals
for [acquisitions] by the standards of the antitrust laws"' 8 ' also meant
that the Commission could be impervious to those laws as guides to the
effect of a transaction on competition and to the competitive factors to
be examined.
The ambiguity with regard to required Commission findings was
eliminated in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. United States.8 2
A three judge district court had reversed an ICC approval of a merger
application on the ground that in the face of an allegation of a viola-
tion of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Commission had failed to ex-
amine the relevant product and geographic markets required for a
traditional section 7 analysis. 8 3 The court distinguished McLean since
that decision had involved a Sherman Act challenge over which the ICC
has no jurisdiction, whereas it has express authority to enforce the
Clayton Act.8 4 The court held that the Commission must make anti-
trust findings "in terms of criteria that have been developed by Congress
and the courts."'185
The Supreme Court negated in clear terms the requirement im-
posed by the district court. 8 6 The case was remanded with directions for
review limited to "[w]hether the Commission has confined itself within
Since Congress has empowered the Commission, and not the courts, to determine
whether the acquisition of control of one carrier by another or by others is con-
sistent with the public interest, the determination of the Commission may not be
set aside unless it can be said that there is no rational basis for it....
That this Court would or might have arrived at a different conclusion, had
it had the duty and responsibility of deciding the controversy between the ap-
plicants, is of no consequence.
It must be remembered that, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it, the power of a court or an administrative agency to decide questions
is not confined to deciding them correctly.
Id. at 897 (footnotes omitted).
180 361 U.S. at 194.
181 321 U.S. at 84-85.
182 382 U.S. 154, vacating and remanding per curiam Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United
States, 242 F. Supp. 14 (M.D. Fla. 1965), on remand 259 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Fla. 1966), afJ'd
per curiam, 386 U.S. 544 (1967).
183 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 14, 22 (M.D. Fla. 1965),
rev'g Seaboard Air Line R.R.-Merger-Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 320 I.C.C. 122 (1963).
184 242 F. Supp. at 19-20.
185 Id. at 22.
186 "We believe that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the direc-
tions [of] this Court .... 382 U.S. at 156,
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the statutory limits upon its discretion and has based its findings on
substantial evidence ... l7 Thus hobbled, the district court was
constrained to reject the modified argument of the plaintiffs that,
although the ICC could not be forced to make a section 7 finding, it
must still employ "modern sophisticated antitrust analysis" as part of
its evaluation of the public interest.188 Although the court felt that
there was value in applying rational economic concepts, "one of the
things that the Supreme Court told us when it vacated our first
decision in this case ... [was that] while rational economic principles
contained in antitrust cases may aid us in pinpointing the danger areas,
we may not require the ICC to travel to its conclusions only by this
route."'8s9 The Supreme Court previously cautioned against loading
the public interest scales in favor of the antitrust factor,190 but the
result in Seaboard amounted to taking that factor from the scales alto-
gether.
On remand, the Antitrust Division unsuccessfully sought to raise
a new point, arguing that the National Transportation Policy favoring
carrier consolidations was intended to assist only financially weak lines,
and that where a merger involves healthy competitors the economies
of scale involved should never outweigh the loss of competition in the
public interest equation. This attempt to analogize past ICC section 5
approvals (and judicial affirmances) to the "failing company" defense
recognized in traditional antitrust circles'9 ' was avoided by the court's
finding that the merging carriers in Seaboard were not financially
healthy.192
The point was again raised in United States v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 93 better known as the Northern Lines cases, which
involved a merger of two large, prosperous, directly competing rail
carriers. The combination had been repeatedly proposed over the
years, 194 but it was not until 1967 that it was approved on terms accept-
187 Id. at 157.
188 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 1001 ().D. Fla. 1966).
189 Id. at 1003.
190 ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1961).
191 See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARv. L. Rav. 226, 339-47 (1960).
192 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1966).
193 396 U.S. 491 (1970), aff'g United States v. ICC, 296 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1968),
aff'g Great N. Pac. & Burlington Lines, Inc.-Merger-Great N. Ry., 331 I.C.C. 228 (1967)
(second report in Northern Lines cases).
194 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (violation of Sherman
Act); Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896) (violation of state law); Great N. Pac.
& Burlington Lines, Inc.-Merger-Great N. Ry., 328 I.C.C. 460 (1966) (first report in
Northern Lines cases; benefits did not outweigh lessening of competition); Great N. Pac.
Ry. Acquisition, 162 I.C.C. 37 (1930) (terms not acceptable to parties).
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able to the parties. 95 The final effort was successful only after reconsid-
eration by the Commission of its initial disapproval where, by a six to
five vote, it "concluded that the proposed merger plan did not
afford benefits of such scope and importance as to outweigh the lessen-
ing of rail competition in the Northern Tier."'196 Following its re-
view of additional evidence in a reopened proceeding-none of which
altered the record on decreased competition-the ICC reversed its
original conclusion. 9 7 This history highlights the obvious. The com-
petitive impact element is not the controlling factor in the Commis-
sion's determination. 98 Given even a serious decline in competition as
a result of a transaction requiring section 5 approval, manipulation of
the other "public interest" factors will ordinarily determine the out-
come.
The Antitrust Division reasserted its "failing company" argu-
ment in the Northern Lines cases in the following manner:
The Department contends that under the statute when a proposed
merger will result in a substantial diminution of competition be-
tween two financially healthy, competing roads, its anticompetitive
effects should preclude the approval of the merger absent a clear
showing that a serious transportation need will be met or important
public benefits will be provided beyond the savings and efficiencies
that normally flow from a merger.199
Again, as in Seaboard, the Division interpreted the legislative history
of the Transportation Act of 1920 200-which encouraged consolidation
-in terms of the promotion of absorption of weak carriers by stronger
ones during financially perilous times. It sought to explain the Trans-
portation Act of 1940201 as only a slight modification of the scheme
to limit such consolidations to those which were voluntary rather than
ICC promoted.202
195 Great N. Pac. & Burlington Lines, Inc.7--Merger-Great N. Ry., 331 I.C.C. 228
(1967), rev'g on rehearing 328 I.C.C. 460 (1966).
196 United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491, 504 (1970). In fact the Commission found a
"drastic" lessening of competition. Id. at 507.
197 Great N. Pac. & Burlington Lines, Inc.-Merger-Great N. Ry., 331 I.C.C. 228
(1967).
198 The Supreme Court has said that "[c]ompetition is merely one consideration here"
(Penn-Central Merger & N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 500 (1968)), and examination
of a merger should not "isolate individual factors that are to enter into the Commission's
decision and view them as the controlling considerations." United States v. ICC, 396
U.S. 491,513 (1970).
199 United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491, 505-07 (1970).
200 Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
201 Ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
202 Cf. County of Matin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412, 416-18 (1958), which ap-
proved an earlier Court interpretation of the Transportation Act of 1940:
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This argument is an especially pregnant one for motor carrier
purposes. Although it represented the only hope for somewhat limiting
further rail mergers, it offered the prospect of wide application to the
trucking industry, which is generally healthy and growing. There
would be few failing companies, and anticompetitive combinations
would face a substantially higher public interest burden of proof. The
contrast with the floundering financial status of railroads suggests the
value of a rule which would distinguish between the economic reali-
ties of the two modes of transportation in the application of the same
statute. The Court, however, rejected the Antitrust Division's argu-
ment.2
03
The courts have now abdicated any serious role in examining con-
trol transactions or reviewing the propriety of an extension of antitrust
immunity to the participants. The issue before the courts is reduced to
little more than whether the Commission's conclusions are supported
by substantial evidence.204 It has become virtually impossible for a
plaintiff, whether the government, a competitor, a shipper, an em-
ployees' organization, a shareholders' committee, or a state or local
community, to reverse an ICC-approved combination on antitrust
grounds. The Commission is receptive to proposals for consolidation,2 05
The Transportation Act of 1940 relieved the Commission of formulating a nation-
wide plan of consolidations. Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission
of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such
terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the pro-
posed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reason-
ableness ....
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 193 (1948).
203 "We find no basis for reading the congressional objective as confining these
mergers to combinations by which the strong rescue the halt and the lame." 396 U.S. at
509.
204 See, e.g., United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491, 520 (1970); Movers' & Warehouse-
men's Ass'n of America v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 563 (D.N.J. 1969); cases cited id. at
568 nn.10 & 11; cf. Helmetag, Railroad Mergers: The Accommodation of the Interstate
Commerce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1493, 1498-1504 (1968); Symposium,
supra note 89, at 227.
Since the Court's Seaboard reversal, another standard for review has been religiously
recited-the Commission's observance of the statutory limits upon its discretion (see text
accompanying note 187 supra). But the interpretation placed on the statute makes this
question irrelevant to antitrust considerations. See Consolidated Freightways Corp.-
Control-S. Plaza Express, Inc., 104 M.C.C. 194, 220 (1967), where the Commission re-
versed its hearing examiner and granted approval to a consolidation on the ground that
preservation of competition is significant only to the extent that it furthers the National
Transportation Policy.
The amount of attention given to the particular facts of each case by the Commis-
sion is open to question. At least one commentator has suggested its opinions are deceptive
on that score. See Hale,'supra note 174, at 398.
205 But see Southern Pac. Co.-Control-Western Pac. R.R., 27 I.C.C. 387 (1965);
discussed in Lindahl, supra note 5, at 64-67.
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and once ICC approval has been granted it continues to insulate the
parties in perpetuity. 0 6 Finally, little or no restraint can be imposed
through proceedings which do not involve the Commission. 207
V
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
After eighty-five years it is probably too late to expect any material
change in the industry-oriented outlook of the ICC. Over the last fifty
years the Commission has abandoned its original view of competition
as an independent value to be promoted along with reliable, safe,
economical transportation services. Stare decisis has effectively closed
the door on judicial revival of a competitive philosophy. This state
of affairs is directly attributable to the short-sightedness of Depression
era legislators; in fairness, the Commission and the courts have been
following rather clear statutory instructions. These mandates are eco-
nomically and historically unsound as applied to the trucking industry.
Legislation created this situation; new legislation can change it.
Motor carriers are the most obvious candidates for experiment.208
The goal implicit in most proposals for change by antitrust advocates is
to move toward a decrease in the regulatory incidents of entry into
and exit from the industry and of operation of a truck line, in phased
steps calculated to provide time for shippers to adjust and to minimize
the economic displacements which are inevitable when support is
removed from an artificial economic structure.
The logical and most cautious first step in such a process is amend-
ment of the statutes regulating surface transportation to place a re-
newed emphasis on competitive values within a regulated context.20 9
This proposal is sometimes misleadingly referred to as deregulation,
while in reality it recognizes a continued interim reliance upon regu-
latory controls of the industry parameters. A subsequent step would
be further amendment to eliminate particular regulatory responsi-
206 See, e.g., Interstate Investors, Inc. v. Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc., 310 F. Supp.
1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 303 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Mo. 1969).
207 See notes 92-95 and accompanying text supra.
208 For a recent summary of the structure of the industry, see Jacobs, supra note 12,
at 88-92. This posture has served to increase advance opposition from entrenched trucking
interests to current government proposals. See generally N.Y. Times, March 25, 1971, at
55, col. 4.
209 See notes 217-56 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of this type of
amendment in terms of a pending legislative proposal.
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bilities and requirements, such as control of entry or rate making.210
A third and final step would be the elimination of all, or most, specific
transportation regulation.2 11
The first of these changes has been seriously promoted periodically
since President Kennedy's Transportation Message to Congress in
1962.212 The program advanced at that time had the firm support of
Professor Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division.213 The underlying theory has bipartisan
appeal, and Richard W. McLaren, Professor Turner's successor in the
Nixon Administration, has continued to promote the concept of legis-
lative change.214
Renewed efforts to prepare a plan for presentation to Congress
commenced in January 1971 with the invitation of the Antitrust
Division for debate within the bar and regulated industries.215 In
February, the President's Council of Economic Advisers emphasized the
need for the development and implementation of a new program.210
210 Cf. National Transportation Act 1966-67, c. 69 (Can.), as amended, CAN. REv.
STAT. c. N-17 (1970).
211 See generally H. KOLSEN, THE ECONOMICS AND CONTROL OF ROAD-.RAIL CoMP'r-
TION (1968); Joy, Unregulated Road Haulage: The Australian Experience, 16 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 275 (1964).
212 J. KENNEDY, THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM OF OUR NATION, H.R. Doc. No. 384,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). That Message stated in part:
Some carriers [railroads] are required to provide, at a loss, services for which
there is little demand. Some carriers [motor carriers] are required to charge rates
which are high in relation to cost in order to shelter competing carriers. Some
carriers are prevented from making full use of their capacity by restrictions on
freedom to solicit business or adjust rates. Restraints on cost-reducing rivalry
in ratemaking often cause competition to take the form of cost-increasing rivalry-
such as excessive promotion and traffic solicitation, or excessive frequency of ser-
vice ....
No simple Federal solution can end the problems of any particular company
or mode of transportation. On the contrary, I am convinced that less Federal
regulation and subsidization is in the long run a prime prerequisite of a healthy
intercity transportation network.
Id. at 2.
213 See Panel Discussion: The Role of Competition in Transportation and Com-
munications, 39 ANTrrRusr L.J. 465, 474 (1970) (remarks of D. Turner).
214 See notes 1-2 supra. President Nixon also urged passage of surface transportation
legislation reducing regulation in his 1972 State of the Union Message. The State of the
Union, 1972, 8 WEEKLY Coap. PPEs. Docs. 74, 87 (Jan. 24, 1972).
The bipartisan appeal of this plea was reemphasized in July 1972 when the
Democratic Party Platform was adopted with a plank, entitled "Toward Economic Jus.
tice," calling for, inter alia, adjustment of "rate-making and regulatory activities, with
particular attention to regulations which increase prices for food, transportation and
other necessities." Reprinted in 118 CONc. REc. Sl,575 (daily ed. July 24, 1972).
215 See McLaren, supra note 1, at 13.
216 PREsIDENT's COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvlsERs, ANNUAL REPORT 127-28 (1971). The
Joint Economic Committee of Congress concurred with the administration's recommenda.
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On November 5, 1971, the Secretary of Transportation forwarded to
Congress a proposed bill entitled "Transportation Regulatory Moder-
nization Act of 1971."217 That proposal was filed as S. 2842 and
H.R. 11826 and referred to the Subcommittee on Surface Transporta-
tion of the Senate Committee on Commerce and to the Subcommittee
on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, respectively, where hearings are now
in progress. 218
S. 2842 reflects the caution generally observed when there is tam-
pering with established interests. Since it proposes several changes
without disturbing the regulatory environment,219 it should be classi-
fied as a step one proposal. It does not, however, deal with all step one
opportunities for improvement, and it is subject to the criticism that,
if passed, it will not serve as an adequate basis for a move to the second
step of eliminating particular regulations.
Three of the problem areas addressed by the bill are relevant to
motor carriers: rates, rate bureaus, and entry. The first and third ele-
ments affect the competitive climate of the industry; the second deter-
mines whether competition will be operative as a practical matter. The
draftsmen characterized the bill as an attack on "the most immediate
and pressing issues in surface transportation regulation within the
context of the present regulatory system." 220 In light of that expressed
intention, the failure to revise the control provisions of Interstate
Commerce Act section 5 is curious. Although the explanation naturally
includes a measure of political realism, the draftsmen may have had a
covert rationale. In Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.-Merger-Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad Co., 221 the Commission approved a mer-
ger despite clear monopoly elements because, in its opinion, it could
tion and urged "a complete reevaluation of government regulation of transportation,
with increased effort made to substitute competition for regulation." JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 1971 JOINT ECONOMIC REPORT, S. RE'. No. 49, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1971).
217 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) and H.R. 11826, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see
Letter from James M. Beggs, Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation, to Carl
Albert and Spiro T. Agnew, November 5, 1971 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
218 Hearings were held before the Senate subcommittee on Nov. 4-5, 16 and Dec. 8,
1971, and Jan. 26-27, March 15, April 7, 26-27, and May 4, 10-12, 19, 1972. That subcom-
mittee is also considering (1) the Administration's companion bill, the Transportation
Assistance Act of 1971, S. 2841, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (19.71), which is designed to provide
federal, financing for railroad rolling stock and to prevent discriminatory state taxation,
and (2) the carrier's bill, the Surface Transportation Act of 1971, S. 2362, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971), which generally increases regulation.: Hearings before the House subcom-
mittee were held.on March 28, April 26-27, and May 24, 9-10, 1972.
219 See notes 225-28, 249-53 and accompanying text infra.
-220 Letter -from James M; Beggs, supra note-217, at 2.
-!kl 32OJLC122 (1968_).. .... ..
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control abuses of monopoly power through its rate regulation.2 2 The
rate freedom provided by S. 2842 may well alter the public interest
balance in future section 5 proceedings and may mitigate the necessity
of addressing that section directly.
A. Rate Making
Control of rates was established to meet three objectives. 223 The
first was to prevent excessive prices and discrimination resulting from
monopoly situations. The increase in intermodal competition has
lessened this concern. The second was to ensure adequate profits for
reinvestment. The advanced stage of railroad consolidation and the
end of wildcat trucking have stabilized financial performance some-
what, yet it is clear that reasonable minimum rates cannot be relied
upon to maintain full rail services.22 4 The third objective was to main-
tain certain uneconomic services in recognition of the reliance by
persons anticipating continued regulation. The only solution to this
momentum aspect is to make rate changes gradual or, again, to provide
adjustment subsidies. The present allocation of excess charges from
fixed rates for other services to cover losses incurred for particular
unremunerative services is a form of forced subsidy by shippers mak-
ing preferable economic decisions, 25 and this silent transfer does not
distribute the burden of a political decision on an equitable basis.
The rate problem is largely a creation of the slight correlation be-
tween costs and prices. The inelasticity imposed by rate regulation pro-
hibits an efficient allocation of resources. S. 2842 seeks to amend
sections 216(d), (e), (g), and (i) of the Interstate Commerce Act226 to
222 Id. at 167. See also notes 182-90 and accompanying text supra.
223 See J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON & C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMIcs OF COMPErITION
IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 4-12 (1959).
224 Some restrictions on entry and expansion in the motor carrier industry may be
necessary to compensate railroads for floating trucking rates, but only government sub-
sidy of railroads for short-haul commodities and long-distance passenger service will
compensate for the loss of rate protection. Extensive financing proposals are contained in
pending bills. S. 2841, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971); S. 2362, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Such
subsidies would provide two beneficial results: the burden of maintaining uneconomic
capacity demanded by the public interest would be shared, and the actual cost would be
more readily ascertainable to determine whether the public interest can justify the
expense.
225 S. 2842, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 206 (1971) would repeal the portion of 49 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1970) which provides for preferential rates, for the carriage, storage, or handling of
property for federal, state, and municipal governments. The present provision is effectively
a reverse public subsidy, exacting excess amounts from a portion of the shipping public
and thereby indirectly benefiting all of the public. . -
226 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(d), (e), (g), (i) (1970).
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create "zone of reasonableness" rate making.m7 Notably, this would not
terminate or even decrease the structure of regulation per se; rather, it
would create new regulatory standards and increase the range of man-
agement discretion within which regulatory controls would not apply.
Furthermore, retention of minimum rate regulation at the prescribed
level would avoid undue preferences for favored shippers, would pre-
vent predatory pricing to injure competitors, and would require pric-
ing decisions which generate some contribution to fixed costs, thereby
encouraging continued investment. The statutory prohibitions on rate
discrimination would not be affected. Maximum rates would only be
restricted when there is no clear competition; otherwise rates would be
presumed to be competitive. No such presumption would apply to al-
ternative service offered only by another motor carrier, presumably
because of the oligopolistic possibilities for price leadership.
Rate making impetus would clearly be on the carriers. The power
of the ICC to suspend a proposed rate would be retained, but it could
be exercised only upon complaint, and only where the complainant al-
leges direct injury, has no alternative remedy, and is likely to sustain
his complaint.2ss These are the traditional grounds for granting a pre-
liminary injunction.
S. 2842 proposes a gradual transformation to soften the displace-
ment expected from rate freedom. No carrier would be permitted to
227 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1971) (proposed amendment to 49 U.S.C.
§ 316(i) (1970). The boundaries of the zone are (1) minimum rates at compensatory
levels, that is, exceeding variable costs for providing specific services, and (2) maximum
rates where there is no "alternative, effective, and competitive" service by another mode,
in which case a rate may not exceed 150% of the fully allocated cost (including a
reasonable return on investment) for that service. If intermodal competition existed there
would be no ceiling on the zone. Id. The Commission would be prohibited from finding
any rate within the zone to be unjust or unreasonable. Id. (proposed amendment to 49
U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970)).
Chairman Stafford's testimony on the bill on behalf of the ICC opposed setting
rate limits by statute. He stated that such ratemaking "always has existed" (statement of
G. Stafford 16, at Hearings Concerning Surface Transportation Legislation Before the Sub-
comm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (March 28, 1972) (on file at the Cornell Law Review)), and
he noted that "flexibility in ratemaking is an 'absolute necessity.'" Id. at 19. Yet he also
urged "that reasonableness is a question of fact calling for the exercise of this Commis-
sion's informed judgment." Id. Such a conception is directly opposed to competitive prin-
ciples which seek to determine reasonableness through a process devoid of imposed judg-
ment.
The Department of Transportation, not the ICC, would promulgate accounting
standards to determine the relevant costs in calculating the zone of reasonableness. S. 2842,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 304 (1971) (proposed amendment to 49 U.S.C. § 316(i)(6) (1970)).
228 S. 2842, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. § 304 (1911) (proposed amendment to 49 U.S.C. § 316(g)
(1970)).
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alter any rate by more than twenty percent in each of the first two
years after enactment2 9
B. Rate Bureaus
The current statutory provisions for horizontal rate agreements
were outlined above in section II.230 Through antitrust immunity, rate
bureaus consisting of competing carriers are encouraged to develop
rates jointly. That concerted activity is balanced by the Commission's
responsibility to review and approve the proposed rates. Creation of a
zone of reasonableness for rates without the need for approval thus
necessitates an alternative public assurance of fairness on rates charged.
S. 2842 adopts the traditional assurance of unilateral rate decision mak-
ing by substituting antitrust penalties for agency review. 23 1
Under the provisions of the bill, existing section 5a232 would be
amended and incorporated into a new Part VI of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.233 The immunity granted by section 5a would be expressly
narrowed to exclude any agreement, discussion, or voting (1) on a single
carrier's movements or (2) that includes as a participant any carrier not
physically participating in the joint or interline movement under
consideration.234 Also excluded would be agreements for joint con-
sideration or action opposing another carrier's rates.235 The bill would
subject this joint action "to such antitrust laws as may be applicable. '236
The draftsmen have explained that this language is intended to con-
tinue the Noerr-Pennington exemption to the extent it may be ap-
plicable,237 but the Antitrust Division has expressed its opinion that
"agreements among carriers which permit them collectively to chal-
lenge the independent rate action of a particular carrier" are "subject
to the full remedies of the antitrust laws" under the bill.238 It is un-
clear whether this interpretation is derived from a construction of the
language of S. 2842 or from an overzealous reading of Trucking Un-
229 Id. § 602(a).
230 See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
231 See text accompanying notes 240-45 infra.
232 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970).
233 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1971) (proposed Interstate Commerce Act
88 601-07).
234 Id. (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 602(12)).
235 Id. (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 602(7)).
236 Id.
237 Letter from James M. Beggs, supra note 217, at 7,
238 Statement of R. McLaren 17, at Hearings Concerning Surface Transportation
Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 27, 1972) (on fie at the Cornell Law Review).
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limited v. California Motor Transport Co. 23 9 Hopefully, this matter
will be clarified in the legislative history.
The bill provides for an interesting antitrust enforcement scheme.
The need for ICC investigation is reduced by a requirement that copies
of all writings pertaining to joint agreements and notices of all meet-
ings be submitted to the ICC; further, a representative of the Com-
mission may attend any meeting.240 Antitrust actions challenging
agreements may be brought by the government in the district courts,241
presumably under the Sherman Act. Private plaintiffs, however, are
restricted to actions for single damages, costs, and attorneys' fees on
complaints filed with the ICC based on horizontal agreements. 2  A
final judgment in a government action is given prima facie effect in the
private action,243 as it is for normal private antitrust enforcement,2 "
and the standard antitrust four year statute of limitations is applicable,
with tolling.245
The bill does not affect the continued use of the antitrust laws to
the extent they previously applied, including private treble damage
actions.2 46 Instead, it opens the area of concerted carrier pricing activi-
ties to the increased restraint of antitrust principles. It is unclear why
the private enforcement procedure is so awkwardly designed, but the
implicit answer is that the carriers remain both politically influential
and more comfortable with the Commission than with the courts. Pos-
sibly to prevent unwarranted industry predictions of disaster and con-
fusion, the Antitrust Division took the unusual step of preparing and
announcing antitrust guidelines under the proposed rate bureau amend-
ments.24 7
239 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); see notes 130-31 and ac-
companying text supra.
240 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1971) (proposed Interstate Commerce Act
§ 602(12)).
241 Id. (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 602(13)).
242 Id. (proposed Interstate Commerce Act §§ 602(13), 603-04).
243 Id. (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 602(13)).
244 Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
245 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1971) (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 607);
see Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970).
246 See Statement of R. McLaren, supra note 238, at 17; Letter from James M. Beggs,
supra note 217, at 7.
247 (1) The purpose of the bill is to place increased reliance upon individual
carrier initiative in rate making. However, insofar as the actual printing and
mailing of tariffs are concerned, carriers would be free to arrange for the pro-
vision of these mechanical services by rate bureaus or independent printing firms
as they elect. (2) All single line carriers or carriers participating in joint routes
who desire to meet rates-lowered by a competitor in the same mode could do so
upon one day's publication, provided that the ICC has not suspended the original
rate action. The reduction of rates to meet competition shall not be suspended
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As with the rate provisions, the rate bureau changes would be
phased into effect. Approved agreements in effect on or before the date
unless the rates of those carriers meeting competition do not cover the variable
cost of providing the service. (3) In cases other than those described in guideline
2, tariff changes applicable to single line service would be preceded by 30 days
notice to affected shippers. Affected shippers may then individually contact and
present their views to the carrier proposing the change. Also, under the con-
ditions set forth in guideline 4, affected shippers may jointly present their views
to the carrier. (4) While no antitrust immunity is provided shippers, so long as the
joint activity is not predatory or anticompetitive as against or among competi-
tors and the latter are not unreasonably denied access to the joint association,
shippers may join together to request a carrier to initiate lower rates. (5) In view
of the provision under the bill that antitrust immunity shall not extend to agree-
ments that permit carriers to engage in joint action on single line movements or
agreements that permit any carrier not physically participating in a joint line
or inter-line movement to take collusive action with respect to that movement, gen-
eral rate increase proposals would be prohibited. Also, "cooperative committees"
and "executive consideration" among or by carriers of different regions would,
for the same reasons, be prohibited. Similarly, no rate bureau shall be allowed
to issue rate advisory or rate interpretations of tariffs for "uniform" tariff action,
nor shall any carrier be allowed to delay action on a joint rate docket by another
carrier or carriers to allow "further study" of such docket. Agreements among rate
bureaus to allow one rate bureau to delay action pending joint consideration by
another rate bureau would be prohibited. Finally, rate bureaus shall not be
allowed to process car-service rates or rules or any terminal rates or rules which
do not involve joint line rates and which would unreasonably restrain commerce.
(6) Antitrust immunity which may have been previously conferred by Section 5a
of the Interstate Commerce Act for agreements authorizing a rate bureau to pro-
test the independent rate action of any one carrier or group of carriers, is re-
moved by the bill. To the extent the antitrust laws are applicable in this area, this
feature of the bill will permit their operation, including treble damage suits by
injured parties. (7) No rate bureau agreement could permit the establishment
of any procedure which would unduly delay publication of tariffs desired by indi-
vidual carriers. Such activity would be inconsistent with the intent of that pro-
vision of the bill discussed in guideline 6. (8) Upon demand of a shipper affected
by the joint action of carriers, the ICC shall make available for inspection and
copying by the shipper, all correspondence and writings of any kind filed by the
carrier in connection with such joint action. (9) Affected shippers may request the
ICC to send a designated representative of the ICC to attend joint meetings of a
bureau conducted pursuant to the new statute. (10) Reasonable and nonexclu-
sionary standardmaking by carriers shall be permitted. (11) Nothing in the Act
is to be construed to diminish the applicability of the antitrust laws to transpor-
tation as it now exists; rather, as noted above, the intent of the bill is to broaden
antitrust coverage.
Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines Under Amended Rate
Bureau Provisions (1972).
It is interesting to note that the promulgation of guideline 10 parallels the FTC's re-
cent concern with the problems of manufacturers' standards for engineering and perfor-
mance and its sympathy with "the growing interest in the development of plans for
self-regulation which will avoid the strictures of the antitrust laws." FTC Advisory Op.
File No. 713 7002, 1 TRADE REG. REP. 1718.20, at 2917-5 (1972).
The guidelines were first introduced in the Senate subcommittee hearings as a part
of Mr. McLaren's testimony. See Statement of R. McLaren, supra note 238, at 18-19. Acting
Assistant Attorney General Walker B. Comegys, McLaren's successor as head of the Anti-
trust Division, introduced them in the House subcommittee hearings as part of his testi-
mony on May 2, 1972. Statement of W. Comegys at Hearings Concerning Surface Trans-
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of enactment would not be automatically affected.248 There is, however,
an ambiguity in the bill concerning whether the Commission's author-
ity to revise approvals is only prospective or whether it is expected to
embark on a program of modification of existing agreements.249
C. Entry
The third motor carrier problem area addressed by S. 2842 con-
cerns the easing of restrictions on entry into the industry and internal
expansion by existing lines. Freedom of entry was directly contrary to
the National Transportation Policy goal of consolidation and simpli-
fication. Stringent enforcement of this phase of regulation has effec-
tively dampened the competition which is possible within the current
statutory framework and has eliminated the element of potential com-
petition.250 Limitations on internal expansion have two significant
anticompetitive effects: the incentive to grow is decreased and merger
is encouraged.
Most motor carriers may be expected to oppose vigorously this
aspect of the bill,251 for it contains a triple threat. First, it will impose
an additional variation of the competitive discipline which rate free-
dom will also create. Carriers' business decisions will have to be based
upon considerations of actual competitors' actions as well as those of
marginal and new competitors on the edge of the market who could be
attracted to enter by abnormally high profits. Second, the bill will
probably affect the uniqueness of the services performed by private and
contract carriers because of increased flexibility in common carriers'
routes and commodities. Third, and perhaps most important, it threat-
ens seriously to depreciate the most valuable asset owned by many small
common carriers, and one for which larger consolidated common car-
riers usually paid dearly-the certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
Noncompetitive inducements to reducing entry restrictions in-
dude the need for speedy expansion of motor carrier services to com-
portation Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 2, 1972),
reprinted in BNA ANTrrausr & TRADE REG. REP., No. 561, May 2, 1972, at E-3.
248 S. 2842, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 603 (1971).
249 Compare id. § 603 with id. § 501 (proposed Interstate Commerce Act § 602(11)).
250 See Hale, supra note 174, at 390-95.
251 The Commission has also asserted its opposition. Chairman Stafford has spe-
cifically mentioned the threat that "[w]ithout the protection and encouragement afforded
by our existing regulatory policies regarding entry, transportation would revert to the
law of the jungle, and survival of the fittest." Statement of G. Stafford, supra note 227, at
G-4. This, of course, is precisely the goal of the legislation.
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pensate for the anticipated acceleration of rail abandonment,252 and
the need to accommodate shifts from rail transportation following the
imposition of compensatory minimum rates.253
Title III of S. 2842 would revise the criteria for the issuance of
common and contract carrier certificates to preclude a denial based
upon an adverse effect on existing carriers, unless the total quantity
and quality of service available to the shipping public would de-
crease.254 Again, the change in standards would be gradual. Existing
common carriers could apply immediately for extended certificates.255
After six months from the date of enactment, existing common carriers
could apply to eliminate any commodity, point, and route limitations
in their current certificates which were imposed solely to prevent a
diversion of traffic from another carrier.256 Only after two years could a
new applicant rely upon the new standard.257
CONCLUSION
Motor carrier regulation has questionable parentage. The legis-
lative history reveals that trucking was regulated with a backward look
at railroads instead of a forward projection toward maximizing motor
carrier opportunities and efficiencies. Particularly notable in this de-
velopment was the sub silentio assumption that regulation would
require antitrust exemption. The policy to ignore obvious differences
between the modes as to competitive opportunities and financial risks
was never explained. The decision was made to conform an entirely
new industry to the model of one that was mature but sluggish and,
in many respects, failing. This lack of foresight was common to both
Congress and the ICC.
The judicial system has been complacent in the face of these
trends. The courts have placed considerable confidence in the ability of
252 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1971), would provide a completely new pro-
cedure for railroad abandonment involving objective standards based on volume of traffic
and anticipated costs.
253 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201(b), 205 (1971), would provide for railroad rate
determinations similar to those for motor carriers discussed in notes 226-27 and accom-
panying text supra.
254 S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301, 303 (1971).
255 Id. § 301.
256 Id. § 302.
257 Id. § 801. The ICC has correctly pointed out that in this instance the phasing is
unnecessarily discriminatory because within two years "the certificated carriers might well
have the opportunity to expand their operations into all the profitable markets and
effectively preclude new carriers from commencing suitable competitive operations." State-
ment of G. Stafford, supra note 227, at G-8.
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the Commission properly to resolve interpretations of the statutes, and
case law has further encouraged both carrier-agency cooperation and
isolation of carrier activities from antitrust restraint. It is not the func-
tion of the judiciary to flaunt congressional priorities, but skepticism as
to legislative intent is warranted in cases of serious diversion from other
fundamental legislative goals.
Regulation has a natural tendency to expand and perpetuate. 258
This phenomenon is probably accelerated for regulation which is
imprudently conceived insofar as it attracts support from vested in-
terests which are unwilling to evaluate proposals solely on their merits.
Surface transportation, particularly the motor carrier industry, is cur-
rently in the position of choosing between the temporary comfort of
the status quo and the endorsement of structural change to promote
continued vitality, modernization, and efficiency. Change within a
highly regulated context is based upon extraneous considerations and
economic guesswork;2 15 9 deregulation would force change adapted to
long-term economic needs. The warning sounded by President
Kennedy in 1962 is even more appropriate today:
If direct and decisive action is not taken in the near future, the
undesirable developments, inefficiencies, inequities, and other un-
desirable conditions that confront us now will cause permanent loss
of essential services or require even more difficult and costly solu-
tions in the not-too-distant future.260
The trucking industry should carefully consider pending and future
legislative proposals affecting the industry with a view toward en-
couraging increased competition and decreased regulation.
258 See Loevinger, supra note 105, at 117.
259 In a recent address, Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, noted
another persistent regulatory failing:
There is another problem that seems to plague any scheme for extensive eco-
nomic regulation. And that involves the inability of a government bureaucrat
sitting in Washington, to make decisions about new changes in the industry he
regulates. Time after time industry must wait months, and in some instances
years, for the regulatory commission to decide how it will handle a new service
and what the price and other characteristics of that service should be. This seems
to occur not only in areas of overall policy guidance but also in the day-to-day ad-
judicatory processes of the regulatory agencies.
Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Product Liability Prevention Conference, Newark, NJ., Aug.
24, 1972, at 7-8 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
260 J. KENNEuY, supra note 212, at 2.
